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Abstract
We develop heterogeneous agent models to investigate financial spillover effects in the context of Quanti-
tative Easing (QE). We consider these spillover effects from two perspectives. The first perspective studies
spillovers within a network of financial institutions. The aim is to understand where amplification effects
occur in the event of a shock. For this purpose, we calibrate a model of fire-sale contagion to the South
African banking sector. We use cross-sectional balance sheet data for 29 South African banking institu-
tions. Fire-sale externalities are pecuniary externalities that operate through prices. They pose a threat
to the financial system because they amplify price shocks across assets and thus lead to liquidation spirals.
In the first step, we investigate general shock propagation scenarios to an unsecured lending portfolio
of a large bank and to a marketable asset held by all banks, i.e. South African government bonds. We
rank individual banks according to their contribution to systemic risk and show the importance of cash
liquidity buffers in reducing risk of fire-sale occurrences. Further, we find a critical threshold parameter
which, if exceeded, makes the banking system highly unstable. In the second step, we build on find-
ings presented by Cecchetti et al. (2017) that determine a relationship between Quantitative Easing and
risk-taking behavior of financial institutions in emerging markets. Assuming that QE increases banks’
leverage, we show that the fire-sale contagion channel becomes much more pronounced. The same shock
to the government bond asset class leads to higher banking sector instability. The risk to banking sector
losses is not linear, but rather increases exponentially with higher leverage ratios.
The second perspective of the dissertation considers spillovers between financial markets in the con-
text of QE. We contribute to the literature that investigates the portfolio balance effect associated with
QE. In essence, the portfolio balance channel is the consequence of an assumed imperfect substitutability
of assets. To account for this, we develop a dynamic agent-based model to study international asset price
spillover. Our two-country model features heterogeneity in assets and in investor preferences. Both are
crucial for a meaningful model-based impact assessment of QE because preferences for asset maturity,
asset class (bonds, equities and currencies) and whether an asset is issued at home or abroad can influence
the substitutability of assets, and hence the portfolio balance effect of central bank asset purchases. We
implement a novel pricing mechanism that allows us to approach market clearing prices. This allows us
to take advantage of the flexibility of the agent-based methodology, while keeping the model comparable
to more standard equilibrium-based portfolio balance models. We calibrate the two countries in our
model to the Eurozone (EZ) and a representative sample of rest-of-the-world (ROW) countries in order
to estimate the international impact of the ECB’s asset purchase program announced in January 2015.
For this purpose, we compile data on asset holdings of 15 374 EZ and 25 930 ROW open-end investment
funds from the Morning Star Database, as well as data on investment portfolios of EZ and ROW banks
from the ECB’s Statistical Warehouse and Bankscope. When simulating our model, we find a negative
impact of central bank asset purchases on both domestic and foreign returns. While the effects of QE
on domestic bond yields and the exchange rate are rather modest and smaller than commonly assumed
in the literature, they can cause domestic stock prices increase substantially. Somewhat surprisingly,
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1
1 Introduction
“Well, the problem with QE is it works in practice, but it doesn’t work in theory.”
Ben Bernanke, former chair of the US Federal Reserve, January 20141
The famous quote Ben Bernanke shared in conversation with the Brookings Institution in early
2014 captures the current puzzle surrounding Quantitative Easing (QE). QE is a central bank
policy that involves large asset purchases in exchange for newly created reserves. It has been used
extensively in advanced economies in the post-crisis area. Despite this, however, our understand-
ing of the underlying transmission channels of QE is inadequate. In particular, the economic
theory literature is lacking models that convincingly describe the relationship between QE, fi-
nancial markets and financial institutions. The dissertation presented here seeks to contribute
to this research gap. We focus on specific aspects of financial spillover in the context of QE and
apply heterogeneous agent models to investigate channels of contagion. This chapter provides
an overview of the main research questions and the methodological approach. Following a brief
problem statement, we will highlight the scope and contributions of the dissertation and give an
outline of the chapters that follow.
1.1 Background and problem statement
Large asset purchase programs known as Quantitative Easing represent a relatively new instru-
ment in central bankers’ toolkit to stimulate aggregate demand. First introduced in Japan in
the early 2000s, QE is thought to ease credit conditions further when the short-term interest
rate approaches its zero lower bound. Since the 2009 financial crisis, the US Fed, the Bank
of England, the Bank of Japan, the Swiss National Bank, the Swedish Riksbank and the ECB
bought a combined value in excess of 15 trillion USD (approx. 18% of world GDP), mostly in
the form of sovereign bonds.2 QE is part of a set of ’unconventional monetary policy’ tools be-
cause it is distinct from the ’traditional’ approach that focuses on the short term interest rate as
main instrument to dampen out spikes in the business cycle. Instead, QE involves the expansion
of central bank balance sheets through the acquisition of assets and hence a broadening of the
money base. For example, the US Fed’s balance sheet increased by 400% between the beginning
of QE1 in 2009 and the tapering of QE3 in 2014. The problem with the QE approach - and this is
what Bernanke was referring to - is that it doesn’t work according to standard monetary theory.
A famous result known as ’Wallace Neutrality’ (Wallace, 1981) predicts that the composition and
1transcript of Brooking Institution conference, page 14,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/20140116_bernanke_remarks_transcript.pdf
2Authors own calculations based on FRED, BOJ, BOE, ECB balance sheet data
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size of central bank balance sheet can have no effect on inflation or employment. Another result
from Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), an important contribution in macro theory, finds central
bank’s purchases of market securities to be irrelevant per se for asset prices, inflation and demand.
Yet we can observe a correlation between QE announcements and movements in financial asset
returns, particularly in the 10-year government bond yield. The growing literature on announce-
ment effects finds evidence that central banks’ QE announcements are reducing domestic gov-
ernment bond yields by sizable amounts (see e.g. Gagnon et al., 2011a; Bauer and Rudebusch,
2014; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011a; Kuttner, 2018, among others).
The dissertation focuses on two aspects of spillovers in the context of QE. The first raises the
question of whether QE may contribute to instability in the banking sector by considering a
specific channel of contagion, i.e. the channel of fire-sale externalities. The second deals with the
relationship between QE and domestic and foreign asset returns for the example of Eurozone QE.
For this purpose, we develop a dynamic portfolio balance model that accounts for heterogeneity
in assets and investors. The model seeks to combine features of what are known as agent-based
models with the equilibrium considerations of traditional economic models. The aims of this
dissertation are threefold. The first aim is to determine conditions under which QE may affect
stability of the banking sector of an emerging market. To address this question, a model of shock
propagation is calibrated to the South African banking sector to investigate determinants of
banking sector instability. The second aim is to develop a model framework that offers sufficient
complexity to replicate real-world financial markets while maintaining computational tractabil-
ity. The third and final aim is to conduct an extensive calibration and simulation study which
allows for the quantification of QE-induced asset price effects. The focus here will be on the
Euro area purchase program, as the research gap is wider than for the US programs and data
is easily available. In working towards these aims, a number of contributions were made, which
will be discussed below.
1.2 Scope and contribution of the study
The main research questions addressed in this study are as follows:
How resilient is the South African banking sector to fire-sale externalities?
Is banking sector stability affected by QE?
Can spillover asset price effects be attributed to the portfolio balance effect of QE?
How does the ECB’s Asset Purchase Program (APP) affect domestic and foreign asset
returns and the exchange rate through the portfolio balance channel?
What are the policy implications for South African regulators concerned about financial
stability of the banking sector?
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The dissertation develops two models to address the research questions outlined above. The
first model calibrates a model of fire-sale externalities in the South African banking sector to
illustrate the resilience of the sector to amplification price effects. The analysis is carried out
from the point of view of banks’ balance sheet data. We demonstrate how balance sheet data
sets can be analyzed in practice and simulate a shock propagation algorithm to identify vulnera-
bilities in this sector. The main contributions of the fire-sale contagion model are twofold. First,
the Greenwood et al. (2015) model is extended by including a cash buffer and calibrated to the
South African banking sector. General shock scenarios for specific asset classes are carried out to
identify exposure to systemic risk in the banking sector in respect of common asset holdings. It
is shown to what extent the South African banking sector is able to absorb price shocks. We rank
individual banks according to their contribution to systemic risk and show the importance of
cash liquidity buffers in reducing risk from fire-sale occurrences. A sensitivity analysis of results
finds a critical illiquidity parameter for the shock scenario regarding SA government bonds. If
shocks to this asset class lead to price effects larger than 10 basis points per 10 bn selling volumes
(i.e. the illiquidity parameter ρ > 1× 10−13), high systemic risk, which requires policy response,
ensues. In addition, a detailed description of banks’ balance sheets is used in a complementary
fashion to give more insight into the distribution of banks’ asset holdings. The tables presented
illustrate common asset holdings which can be used to determine the exposure of banks’ portfo-
lios to asset write-downs at a specific date in time. Second, a scenario of fire-sale amplification
is simulated in the context of QE. Here we build on findings by Cecchetti et al. (2017), who find
that QE leads to an increase in leverage of financial institutions in emerging markets. Assum-
ing that QE leads to higher risk-taking behavior of South African banks by means of increased
leverage, the exposure to fire-sale externalities to asset losses increases substantially.
The second model presented in this dissertation is a dynamic portfolio balance model to in-
vestigate spillover effects by means of a two-country model. This model was developed together
with two co-authors, Jesper Riedler and Joeri Schasfoort. At the heart of the model are port-
folio optimising investors who allocate capital across a domestic and a foreign market. We then
conduct a policy experiment in which the central bank of the domestic market conducts asset
purchases in their market ranging from EUR200bn to EUR2.6tn. We contribute methodologi-
cally by including heterogeneous agents and assets, which we believe is crucial for a meaningful
assessment of QE within the portfolio balance channel. To our knowledge, we are the first to
demonstrate the effect of QE while accounting for:
• Endogenous outcome variables. QE-induced asset price and exchange rate effects are the
result of agents’ portfolio optimisation given the interaction of risk and return variables,
availability of assets and expectations formation.
• Dynamic covariance structure. Our model allows for the interactions between variables over
time. Agents take into account a time-varying variance-covariance structure of returns.
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• Consideration of preferred habitat preferences. We introduce asset-specific preferred habi-
tat parameters to account for heterogeneous investors’ preferences for asset maturity, issuer
nationality, default risk and inflation risk. These preferred habitat parameters are akin to
the risk aversion parameter from the standard mean variance portfolio selection problem
Markowitz (1952), however they conflate all the aforementioned preferences above.
• Computational tractability. A shortfall of many agent based models is their lack of
tractability. We use a price-setting algorithm that finds daily equilibrium prices.
• Parsimonious modelling of maturity. We introduce heterogeneity in asset maturity by
introducing constant repayment rates and a maturity parameter. In this manner, we can
model equity portfolios (that never mature) and bond maturities with different repayment
characteristics in a parsimonious manner.
• Empirical data. For the calibration of the model, we compile a global dataset of investment
funds’ and banks’ balance sheets. We match the maturity profile of funds by applying our
modelling approach to a holding sample of 15,374 open-ended investment funds. Further-
more, we calibrate our model to reflect preferred habitat preferences as revealed in investor
holding positions.
• Result replication. Our framework gives us the advantage of conducting policy experiments
in a ’lab environment’. We can replicate results and vary conditions (for example, exam-
ining what happens if the business cycle features higher defaults and hence, higher default
risk) to investigate determinants of asset price effects.
• Quantification. Our policy experiment leads us to believe that asset price effects from port-
folio balancing are smaller than what is commonly assumed in the literature. Breckenfelder
et al. (2016) conduct a review of empirical studies on the ECB’s APP and find a reduction
in the domestic government bond yield of 37 - 88 bps. Our findings can be summarised as
follows:
EZ bonds: -16 bps in yields, +0.9% in price
EZ equities: -50 bps in yields, +6.6% in price
ROW bonds: -1 bps in yields, +0% in price
ROW equities: -3 bps in yields, +0.4% in price
EUR/ROW exchange rate: -0.4%
One should note that the effect we measure is in respect of market EZ bond portfolios,
market EZ equity portfolios etc. Our results are less pronounced than what is found in
most event studies for the US, but they are in line with recent empirical results for the
Euro area presented by Koijen et al. (2016). We discuss the underlying factors that play a
role in this discrepancy in section 6.1.
The following section gives an overview of chapters, indicating which sections address which
topics.
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1.3 Organisation of the study
This study is divided into three parts. In PART I, we give a overview of the relevant literature
strands on spillover between (1) financial institutions and (2) financial markets and their relevance
to Quantitative Easing. Considering (1), we emphasize models of fire-sale contagion and their
implications for systemic risk. Our first contribution is to draw together the two strands in the
literature that highlight the importance of leverage as the threat for financial stability and the
transmission of QE. In PART II of the dissertation we build on Cecchetti et al. (2017) findings
and investigate vulnerabilities that arise in the South African banking system following higher
leverage. We are the first to investigate the impact of the risk-taking channel on indirect fire-sale
contagion for the example of South Africa. We propose an extension of the Greenwood et al.
(2015) model to account for more realistic liquidation behavior. In section 3.3 we proceed to
simulate asset price shocks to the system. The data is cross-sectional balance sheet data of
29 banks provided by the BA900 forms of the South African Reserve Bank. Subsequently, we
consider the hypothesis of Cecchetti et al. (2017) and conduct shock scenarios assuming that QE
leads to higher leverage within the banking system.
In PART III, we shift the focus from financial institutions to financial markets. Chapter 4
develops the heterogeneous agent model used to determine international asset price movements
through the portfolio balance channel. Chapter 5 calibrates and simulates the model to the
Eurozone’s Quantitative Easing program. The results are discussed in section 5.3.
Last but not least, Chapter 6 presents conclusions and policy implications resulting from the
findings of the dissertation and highlights areas that provide scope for future research.
6
PART I - Literature
2 Financial spillover literature in the context of QE
We start the analysis by reviewing the relevant literature. The aim of this chapter is to give
an overview on the topic of QE and how it is related to the literature on financial spillover. In
Section 2.3, we introduce agent-based modelling and discuss why it is a suitable methodology to
address our research questions.
2.1 Quantitative Easing - a new tool for central bankers
The short-term interest rate has been the most important tool available to central bankers to
conduct monetary policy. It determines the cost of credit in the domestic economy and greatly
influences capital spending, consumption expenditure, inflation and the exchange rate. The
transmission of monetary policy through the interest rate channel has played a major role in the
economic literature in the last 50 years (Mishkin, 1995).
In the last decade, however, central banks faced a new challenge as policy rates reached the zero
rate bound, but they still had to support the economy. When the financial crisis unfolded in
November 2008, the US federal funds rate had already been reduced to close to zero. That’s
when the US Fed turned to unconventional monetary policy in the form of Quantitative Easing.
In the first QE program, Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) 1, the US Fed bought USD 600bn
mortgage-backed securities and bonds issued by government-sponsored firms. Overall, the US
Fed would increase its balance sheet from USD 900 bn to USD 4.5 tn in three separate rounds
of QE between 2008 and 2014. These actions were taken to “put downward pressure on longer-
term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions
more accommodative.”1 In addition, the Fed began to conduct ’forward guidance’, i.e. it made
explicit references to the likely path of short-term interest rate in its policy statements (Kuttner,
2018). Contrary to conventional monetary policy, the announcement of QE was never tied to
a specific target in respect of lowering the long-term interest rate. One reason for this is that
the transmission channel of QE was simply not known. The LSAP programs bought a variety
of mortgage-backed securities and longer-term US Treasuries and the interest rate effect was not
clear given a set of purchases. In fact, the transmission of QE policy is still the subject of much
debate today with no clear consensus. All we know is that QE drastically changed the size and
composition of major central bank balance sheets and that this correlated with a decline in long
1Federal Open Market Committee press release October 24, 2012







































































Figure 2.1: Growth in total assets of central banks of the US, Euro area, Sweden,
Switzerland and Japan since 2005. For the UK, growth is measured from 2009
due to limited data availability. Upper chart: Growth in total assets of US Fed,
ECB, Bank of Japan and Swedish Riksbank. Lower chart: Growth in total assets
of Swiss National Bank and Bank of England. Source: FRED, Federal Reserve
Bank of St Louis.
term interest rates (see Figure 2.4 on page 18). PART III of the dissertation presents a model
to investigate whether this decline could have been a function of one particular transmission
channel, i.e. portfolio balancing.
While QE played a major role in the crisis resolution in the US from 2008 onwards, it was first
used by the Bank of Japan in the early 2000s. At the time, the Japanese economy experi-
enced a series of challenges characterised by stagnant growth, deflation, distressed banks’ balance
sheets and near-zero interest rates. Krugman (1998) argues that Japan was in a liquidity trap,
a situation where monetary policy becomes ineffective even though the nominal rate is close to
zero. Krugman shows this by using a framework that was first introduced by John Hicks in 1937,
incorporating the emergence of a liquidity trap in an IS-LM model (Hicks, 1937). Krugman’s
argument is that the wrong kind of economic shock can lead the economy into a bad equilib-
rium state in which real interest rates don’t reach a low enough level to stimulate the economy.
Demand is persistently low and the economy is stuck in a situation with a consistent and large
output gap. Krugman estimated that the Japanese output gap exceeded 8% in 1998. Krugman’s
paper also proposed solutions for this situation in the form of large-scale borrowing and spending
on the part of the government, as well as tolerating higher expected inflation in the future on
the part of the central bank. This would cause a decline in real interest rates in the present
and contribute towards stimulating demand. In short, the recipe was a radical expansionary
monetary policy.
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In fear of facing a deflationary spiral, the Japanese central bank committed to providing am-
ple liquidity by means of creating additional reserves through QE until the deflation would end
(Ueda, 2012). The rationale was that banks would be less constrained in terms of reserves avail-
able and would start lending out to the real sector. From March 2001, the Bank of Japan bought
Yen 400 bn worth of assets per month, which was gradually increased to Yen 1200 bn by May
2004. QE was briefly lifted in March 2006, but eventually resumed in October 2010 in the wake
of the global financial crisis (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2018). Mechanically, the QE of the US Fed and
the QE of the Bank of Japan were quite similar. Both bought assets in large quantities by creat-
ing large amounts of extra reserves and expanding their balance sheets. However, Bernanke has
stressed that the Fed’s QE policy was different in the sense that they focused on the composition
of the Fed’s balance sheet and its effect on those assets, while the BOJ had the intention of
increasing the money supply with the additional reserves (Bernanke, 2017).
The Euro area faced its own challenges when dealing with the aftermath of the global fi-
nancial crisis from 2008 to 2009 and an unfolding sovereign debt crisis from 2010 to 2013. Early
policy responses on the part of the ECB focused on the provision of liquidity in the form of
Main Refinancing Operations (MROs), Long-term Refinancing Operations (LROs) and a broad-
ening of the type of collateral allowed. These refinancing operations can be viewed as ’lender of
last resort’ actions in which the ECB makes credit available to distressed financial institutions
(Dell’Ariccia et al., 2018). Only at the beginning of 2015, as growth in the Euro area stagnated
and inflation was persistently below the 2% target, did the ECB start its own large-scale Asset
Purchase Program (APP). Over the course of nearly four years, from March 2015 until the end of
2018, the ECB grew its assets by EUR 2.6 trillion by purchasing a mix of asset-backed securities,
corporate bonds and government bonds.
As shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, QE was an established monetary policy tool by the
end of the 2010s in the US, Japan, the UK, the Euro area, Sweden and Switzerland. By 2019,
the US Fed, the BOJ, the ECB and the Riksbank of Sweden grew their balance sheets between
three and four times relative to their pre-2005 levels. The Bank of England and the Swiss Na-
tional Bank expanded their balance sheet even more aggressively by 700% and 800% respectively.
The combined value of total assets held by those central banks is well over USD 15 trillion, or
more than 18% of global GDP today2. Central banks financed these USD 15 trillion by creating
reserves in the banking system, most of which ended up as excess reserves on banks’ balance
sheets (Thornton, 2015).
The literature on QE is vast and the debate on its transmission channels is ongoing and intriguing.
However, the aim of this dissertation is not to evaluate if QE was an effective monetary policy
to stimulate the economy. We would need to dig deeper into the respective macro-economic and
monetary theories. Instead, we consider QE from a spillover perspective with a special focus on
two channels that will be at the centre of our heterogeneous agent models. In the next section
we will discuss the financial spillover literature and establish the links that explain its relevance
in the context of QE.
2Ovaska, Reuters Graphics http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/GLOBAL-CENTRALBANKS/010041ZQ4B7/index.html
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Figure 2.2: Central bank assets to GDP ratio for the US, Euro area, Sweden,
Switzerland, Japan and UK. Upper Chart: All countries. Lower chart: ’Zooming’
in on the EU, US and UK. Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.
2.2 Financial spillover
Financial spillovers are externalities that become more and more important in an increasingly
integrated world economy. They can be positive or negative, but from a systemic risk perspective,
a large literature is devoted to studying negative externalities that arise from growing financial
integration (e.g. Berrospide et al., 2016; Glasserman and Young, 2016; Schnabl, 2012; Edison
et al., 2002; Agénor and da Silva, 2018). In this context, financial spillovers are associated with
the transmission of shocks across interconnected markets and financial institutions. The rising
degree of integration of the global economy leads to new policy challenges, such as how to prevent
contagion of financial volatility and boom and bust cycles.
At the same time, the effectiveness of Quantitative Easing as a new form of monetary policy
has been discussed extensively in recent years (see Kuttner (2018) for a recent review, Neely
(2015) for an affirmative view and Greenlaw et al. (2018) for a sceptical view). From a domestic
perspective, an important question is whether QE decreases the yield of the safe asset, i.e. the
10-year government bond, and whether this supports the real economy (e.g. Schenkelberg and
Watzka, 2013; Weale and Wieladek, 2016). From an international perspective, researchers and
policymakers are concerned with the fact that QE may destabilise emerging markets by causing
sudden reversals in capital flows and asset price bubbles (Raghuram, 2014).
Figure 2.3 shows the different channels that are being discussed in the QE literature and the
literature on financial spillover between markets and institutions. It is important to note that
these channels are interconnected and occur simultaneously, and disentangling them is inherently


































Figure 2.3: Red circle: QE literature overlaps with ’spillover between financial
markets’ and ’spillover between financial institutions’. Bold channels highlight
the focus of the dissertation on portfolio balance channel and indirect contagion
channel.
difficult.
The international asset price channel plays an important role within the ’market view’. Due
to the ongoing international diversification and rising cross-border holdings, asset prices are cor-
related across geographical regions (Bekaert et al., 2011). In the context of QE, there are two
channels that are highlighted to act as underlying transmission mechanisms for asset price effects:
1) the portfolio balancing channel and 2) the signalling channel (Bhattarai and Neely,
2016; Gagnon et al., 2011a; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011b). They are displayed
at the ’borders’ of respective circles in Figure 2.3 because they play a role in various strands,
i.e domestic and international asset price effects, as well as market spillover and institutional
spillover. The portfolio balance channel refers to the supply and demand effects which are as-
sociated with QE. When central banks buy certain assets on a large scale, the supply of that
asset decreases. This may lead to changes in the price of the assets that were bought, as well
as other assets in the market. For example, lower yields of bonds in one market may lead to
substitution effects towards higher yielding assets in other market segments and/or geographical
regions. However, it is not clear whether the portfolio balancing effect actually occurred and
whether it resulted in significant changes in asset prices and returns. There are several points
to consider. Farmer (2012, p.3) pointed out that ’much of the academic discussion concerning
the effectiveness of qualitative easing has been conducted in the context of general equilibrium
models where rational forward-looking agents are able to trade securities in a set of complete
financial markets’. In this framework, central bank asset purchases represent a swap of one
interest-bearing asset (government bond) for another (cash reserves) and are ’irrelevant, because
complete markets transfer risk completely and efficiently’ (ibid). Rational agents internalise this
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swap on the part of the central bank and adjust their positions to reverse the central bank inter-
vention. Hence, a change in the composition and size of the central bank’s balance sheet can’t
have an effect on asset prices (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Wallace, 1981). In addition, one
should note that on aggregate, banks are ’forced’ to hold the reserves newly created by QE. It
is impossible to get rid of reserves in the system as a whole, so the cash will end up on some
banks’ balance sheet. The portfolio balance channel plays an important role in this dissertation
and will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.2.
The signalling channel refers to the fact that announcements about asset purchases affect ex-
pectations of market participants, which in turn feed back into asset prices. This channel is
about the information that is contained in central bank decisions and is not directly linked to
the purchase operations. For example, announcements about US QE programs may ’signal’ con-
tinuing accommodative monetary policy leading to lower expected long-term interest rates in
the US, which in turn may lead to lower expected long-term interest rates in emerging markets
if other countries also pursue an accommodative monetary policy stance. These kind of policy
spillovers are important within the literature for financial market spillover and are discussed, for
example, by Mohanty (2014) in the context of QE and by Rey (2016) in a general way. The last
sub-field in the left circle, ’Trade linkages’, is an example of financial market spillover that are
not directly relevant in the context of QE. This literature emphasises the role of trade in financial
contagion, and emerged following a series of currency crises in the late 90s (Eichengreen et al.,
1996; Caramazza et al., 2004; Glick and Rose, 1999). One of the findings of this literature is that
contagion associated with currency crises spreads more easily between countries that are con-
nected by international trade linkages than, for example, countries having similar macroeconomic
conditions. The underlying transmission channel for these kind of spillovers is the exchange rate
channel. For example, if one country suffers a speculative attack on its currency and experiences
large currency depreciation, its exports become more competitive, which can lead to growing
current account deficit with its trading partner. If this process becomes excessive, the trading
partner could in turn experience a critical situation with its central bank depleting its foreign
reserves and its currency depreciating to a degree that destabilises its banking system.
Financial spillovers between financial institutions are represented by the turquoise circle on the
right-hand side in Figure 2.3. Within this literature, there is a focus on systemic risk arising
from contagious processes within interconnected financial networks, with many papers focusing
on the banking sector (two excellent reviews are presented in Summer, 2013; Glasserman and
Young, 2016). Topics related to contagion in financial networks investigate the amplification of
shocks through direct and indirect balance sheet linkages, price spillovers and risk-taking be-
haviour. Direct contagion typically focuses on the liability side of financial institutions and on
how losses associated with defaulting debt contracts and receding liquidity spread across the
interbank market (Upper and Worms, 2004), while indirect contagion focuses more on the asset
side and the role of common asset holdings. Recent papers model contagion across different types
of institutions like money market funds and banks (Cipriani et al., 2013), as well as banks and
mutual funds (see e.g. Puy, 2016; Calimani et al., 2017; Baranova et al., 2017).
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However, in the context of QE, the risk-taking channel is the most important channel within
the literature on spillover between financial institutions (see e.g. Dell’ariccia et al., 2017; Rijck-
eghem and Weder, 2001; Rodnyansky and Darmouni, Rodnyansky and Darmouni). One aspect
of this channel is bank lending. The bank lending channel describes the relationship between
Quantitative Easing and banks’ credit extension to domestic and international financial institu-
tions and firms. Morais et al. (2019) show in the example of Mexico that British QE increased
foreign credit supply to Mexican firms via institutional linkages. For the EU market, a recent
paper by Grosse-Rueschkamp et al. (2019) demonstrates that Euro area QE resulted in higher
risk-taking in corporate credit extension of European banks with low capitalisation ratios and
high non-performing loans. For the US market, Kandrac and Schlusche (2017) show that US
QE programs increased the share of risky loans on a sample of about 3000 US banks. Banks’
risk-taking behaviour is also at the centre of attention in a paper by Cecchetti et al. (2017), who
document that US QE led to increasing bank leverage in a sample of non-US banks.
PART II of the dissertation develops an agent-based model to study spillover effects between
financial institutions in the context of QE. To do this, we build on Cecchetti et al. (2017)’s
findings and investigate the role of banks’ leverage in a price-shock propagation model for the
South African banking sector. More specifically, we focus on one source of systemic risk and in-
vestigate the emergence of fire-sale externalities within the South African banking sector. Before
we proceed, however, we will discuss the contagion channels that arise in financial networks in
more detail in the next section.
2.2.1 Channels of contagion in financial networks
Even before the financial crisis researchers knew that systemic risk can arise in many forms.
Triggers of systemic events include, for example, bank runs or large-scale loan defaults on the
part of over-indebted households. However, systemic risk also resides "within" the financial sys-
tem in the complex nature of the interconnected relationships between institutions which are
not obvious to the observer. A large literature seeks to measure this kind of systemic risk by
tracing amplification mechanisms that propagate shocks in those networks. These amplification
effects can be direct or indirect and arise in different channels of contagion. Direct amplification
typically occurs between financial institutions which are connected through bilateral contractual
obligations (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Interbank loans are one example of such direct
balance sheet linkages which play a role in loss propagation. If one financial institution defaults
on its liabilities, it adversely impacts the balance sheet of another financial institution, which
triggers further losses and so on. This is referred to as domino contagion or cascades of defaults.
The seminal paper in this field is Eisenberg and Noe (2001), which study how payment short-
falls spread in the banking sector following the bankruptcy of one or more individual institutions.
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) show that under certain assumptions and given a network of nodes and
interbank obligations, there exists a "unique clearing vector" that determines the damage of the
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insolvency shock. The framework provides a tool to quantify systemic losses by tracking how the
initial default propagates across the system. To allow for the mathematical solutions, the model
has simplified assumptions. For example, banks maximise the entropy of their linkages, which
means that they spread their interbank exposures as evenly as possible across counterparties.
Furthermore, there are no recovery rates; all payment obligations have equal priority and conta-
gion can only arise from domestic exposures. Eisenberg and Noe (2001)’s framework was widely
applied to model and quantify systemic losses from interbank default contagion and there exist
many variations of the original model. Fischer (2014), for example, derives a more general case
in which there are obligations with different seniority levels and simple derivatives. There is also
an extensive literature investigating the effect of the network structure on such default cascades
(see e.g. Gai et al., 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2015; Georg, 2013). The role of network structure is
reviewed by Allen et al. (2010), who conclude that a system with a more complete set of con-
nections may be less susceptible to contagion than those with an incomplete connection structure.
But financial systems are not only vulnerable to direct amplification effects that arise from
insolvency contagion, but also to indirect amplification effects that can propagate through price
shocks. To account for both direct and indirect amplifiers, Glasserman and Young (2015) use
Eisenberg and Noe (2001)’s framework and expand it by introducing bankruptcy costs, market-
to-market losses and confidence shocks. They find that the topology of the network is particu-
larly important once bankruptcy costs are accounted for. When comparing direct with indirect
amplification effects, they conclude that indirect effects from price drops associated with mark-
to-market accounting may have a higher impact on systemic losses than pure “domino” effects
from direct default contagion. This is because, in severe cases, large price declines lead to self-
reinforcing liquidation spirals. When banks are in distress and want to cover their losses, they
"dump" their assets on the market, which leads to excess supply and further depresses prices.
Such price-mediated liquidation spirals are modeled as fire-sale externalities in the literature.
Fire-sale contagion
Fire-sale externalities are pecuniary externalities that operate through prices. They pose a threat
to the financial system because they amplify price shocks across assets and thus lead to liquida-
tion spirals. Post-crisis, they have received a lot of attention as researchers emphasised the role of
fire-sales as a source of systemic risk. Shleifer and Vishny (2011) give a good overview and define
fire-sales as forced sales of illiquid assets, which are traded at prices far below value and which
propagate across various asset classes and institutions. Furthermore, they highlight that fire-
sales are particularly potent as a destabilising factor in the financial sector because of financial
institutions’ vulnerability to sudden stops in their short-term financing. Even though the litera-
ture on fire-sales has been expanding recently, the models which are used to study these effects
are set up in a similar way. Typically, there is a set of financial institutions which are holding
common assets on their balance sheets and which are subject to a binding constraint, example,
regarding their leverage capital requirements or risk-weighted capital requirements. There is an
exogenous shock that hits the system and financial institutions start liquidating assets as their
constraint is violated. This causes a drop in market prices and induces "second round" losses
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which potentially trigger further liquidations. An important assumption that drives these models
concerns the price impact, i.e. how much the price moves given the liquidity and trading volumes
of an asset. The table below serves as illustration of different fire-sale modelling approaches in
the theoretical and empirical literature. It’s noteworthy that most theoretical contributions are
able to integrate into multiple contagion channels using stylised balance sheets. In empirical
papers, researchers apply fire-sale algorithms on more realistic balance sheets, but use simpler
model frameworks.
In their theoretical work, Cifuentes et al. (2005) use an exponential price impact in a system
of banks that engage in fire-sales following a shock to one tradeable asset. If liquidation gains
of this asset are not sufficient, banks start selling the illiquid asset to restore their fixed risk-
weighted capital ratio. If they still can’t bring their capital ratio back within required levels,
banks will default and trigger direct contagion to its counterparties. By employing Eisenberg
and Noe (2001)’s framework, Cifuentes et al. (2005) are able to determine equilibrium payments
between banks and equilibrium prices of assets. Nier et al. (2007) construct an artificial banking
system and investigate contagion probability in a network of banks with an exponential price
impact function. Fire-sales occur in the event of a bank default as all assets of the insolvent bank
are dumped on the market. Caccioli et al. (2014) use a similar approach where an insolvency
of one institution triggers fire-sales and default contagion within a network of banks. In their
stylized model, they find that banking systems are stable below a critical value of leverage and
become more and more unstable as leverage increases above this value. In a recent ECB work-
ing paper, Calimani et al. (2017) simulate a financial system with banks and asset managers,
label shadow banks, and investigate contagion from fire-sale externalities and interbank default
contagion across different types of financial institutions. They model an interbank loan market
with endogenous interest rates and introduce a liquidity shock to financial institutions. Inter-
estingly, they find that the shadow banking sector is able to absorb small shocks better than
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QE, leverage and fire-sale contagion as pitfalls for financial stability
Fire-sale externalities occur in situations where financial institutions experience sudden con-
straints, e.g. a large liquidity requirement, which lead to forced liquidation of assets. A trigger
for such a condition is a large exogenous shock, for example, a bankruptcy of a major investment
bank as we have seen with Lehman Brothers in 2008. An unconventional monetary policy in
the form of Quantitative Easing is unlikely to cause such an event. In the last decade, QE was
implemented in the US, UK, Japan, Canada, Sweden, Eurozone and Switzerland. During this
time, we have not seen evidence that central bank purchase programs would cause liquidation
spirals in banking systems. However, QE may affect fire-sale spillover indirectly through chang-
ing risk-taking behavior of financial institutions. Borio and Zhu (2012) were among the first to
highlight the link between accommodative monetary policy and risk-taking. They coined the
term "risk-taking channel", which describes the effects that work through the risk appetite of
financial intermediaries. One way to investigate the relationship between risk-taking and mon-
etary policy is to determine how monetary policy influences leverage. In fact, Bruno and Shin
(2015) argue that bank leverage acts as the linchpin of the risk-taking channel of monetary pol-
icy. Using quarterly data from 1995 to 2012, they show that, following an expansionary shock to
US monetary policy, higher leverage of international banks increases cross-border bank capital
flows. In respect of Quantitative Easing, Cecchetti et al. (2017) conduct an empirical analysis
of the link between the Fed’s QE and leverage ratios of US and non US banks. They find sig-
nificant evidence of QE increasing leverage in both bank and non-bank financial intermediaries
outside of the US. This suggests that through the role of leverage, QE may have detrimental
effects for financial stability. It has been shown empirically by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012)
in an extensive study on data from 1973 to 2010 that a rapid increase in leverage stood out
as a significant factor in predicting financial crises for both developed countries and emerging
markets. In a similar way, Schularick and Taylor (2012) use data on 14 developed countries from
1870 to 2008 and come to the conclusion that leverage plays an important role in contributing
towards financial vulnerability, especially leverage within the banking sector.
Our first contribution is to draw together the two strands in the literature that highlight the
importance of leverage as the common thread for financial stability and the transmission of
unconventional monetary policy. In PART II of the dissertation we build on Cecchetti et al.
(2017)’s findings and investigate vulnerabilities that arise in the South African banking system
following higher leverage. We are the first to investigate the impact of the risk-taking channel
on indirect fire-sale contagion for the example of South Africa.
2.2.2 Channels of contagion through international asset price effects
PART III of the dissertation develops a dynamic heterogeneous agent model to determine price
spillover in the context of QE. The aim of this section is to review the literature that looks at the
link between QE and financial markets, particularly in respect of asset returns. There are two
main channels that are being discussed that could potentially move asset prices: the signalling
channel and the portfolio balance channel.
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The signalling channel
The signalling channel considers the fact that central bank communication of asset purchases
affects market participants’ expectations. For example, central banks’ QE announcements can
be interpreted as a commitment to keeping an accommodative stance of monetary policy. This
may signal more favourable macro-economic conditions in the future and higher firm output and
dividends, which feed back into the pricing kernel of equities. In more general terms, Cochrane
(2009) advocates that the price of any asset equals the expected future payoff x discounted by a
factor m, i.e. pt = E[mt+1xt+1]. QE can then work through the signalling channel by changing
either the discount factor or the expected income stream.
In the case of bonds, the expected future income stream is known due to the ’fixed’ coupon
and principal repayment. The discount rate, however, may change in the future, for example
if the short term interest rate rises. This implied interest rate risk is higher, the higher the
uncertainty and the longer the time to maturity. In addition, the discount rate may be affected
by the perceived default risk of the asset issuer which can vary over time. High risk requires com-
pensation, which is why higher default probability increases the discount factor, which results in
lower bond prices.
Government bonds
In theory, the default risk for government bonds is 0 because governments can always raise taxes
to fulfill their financial obligations. To investigate the relationship between QE and government
bond returns, it is common to focus on the 10-year bond because it is the risk-free long-term
interest rate in the market. The analysis of the 10-year bond yields plays an important role in
the QE literature. The upper row in Figure 2.4 shows the correlation between movements in
long-term interest rates in the US and Germany with periods of balance sheets’ expansion (grey
shaded area). Overall, there is a downward trend in long-term interest rates; however, it is not
entirely clear what happens during the implementation of QE. In the US, in particular, it seems
that long-term interest rates increased during the US Fed’s large-scale asset purchases (LSAP).
The empirical challenge is to infer causality between QE and asset price movements in the face
of many confounding factors and endogeneity problems, for example in respect to simultaneity
and omitted variables.
In an attempt to curb endogeneity issues, a large strand of literature uses an event study ap-
proach when investigating the impact of QE announcements on bond yields. In these papers, high
frequency data is used on a narrow window around central banks’ asset purchase announcements
or implementation days. Some of those studies inform their regression with models that decom-
pose the yield into an component reflecting the average expected short term interest rate and a
risk premium component (see e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011a; Krishnamurthy
et al., 2017; Christensen and Krogstrup, 2018). This approach can be traced back to amended
versions of the expectation hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. Term structure
models are derived from a no-arbitrage argument and determine long-term interest rates to be
the average expected short-term interest rate plus a risk premium (Cox et al., 1985). Researchers
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Figure 2.4: Left: US long-term interest rates (10 year Treasury bond) in percent
(top), US Fed balance sheet in trillion USD (middle) and US S&P500 Equity
price index (bottom). Right: Long-term interest rate of the 10 year German
Bund in percent (top), ECB’s total assets in in trillion USD (middle) and DAX
stock market price index (bottom). Shaded areas indicate periods of balance sheet
expansion during the US Fed’s Q1 to Q3 program and the ECB’s APP. Source:
FRED, Federal Reserve of St Louis.
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seek to identify the signalling channel by tracing changes in the expectation component of the
yield around QE announcements. In the case where not the expectation component, but the risk
premium is affected, the underlying channel is presumed to be the portfolio balance channel.
The portfolio balance channel plays an important role in this dissertation and is be the focus of
the next section.
The portfolio balance channel
The portfolio balance effect is the other main channel in discussion of whether QE affects finan-
cial asset returns. In fact, when QE was introduced in the US and UK in the wake of the crisis,
policymakers stated that they anticipate this to be the main channel to lower long-term interest
rates (see e.g Bernanke, 2008; Dale, 2010).
The hypothesis behind the portfolio balance effect is that central bank purchases affect quantities
of assets available in the market, which will lead to changes in assets’ expected returns. One
underlying assumption of this is that assets are imperfect substitutes allowing for investors to
have different downward-sloping demand curves. This is why it is also referred to as channel of
imperfect asset substitution (Kuttner, 2018). To give two examples, pension funds can have a
higher preference for assets of longer maturity and hedge funds can be particularly demanding
of assets with high price volatility.
Theory
Even though policymakers were anticipating the portfolio balance effect, its existence is contested
in the economic theory literature (Thornton, 2012). This is because there are several theoretical
frameworks in which a relationship between relative asset supplies and their expected return is
not possible.
First, from the perspective of the consumption-based asset pricing approach in the macro litera-
ture, the pricing kernel of an asset depends on its expected state-contingent cash flows and their
relation to households’ state-contingent income. If we think of QE as a swap of assets between
the central bank and the private sector in the sense that one public sector liability (’govern-
ment bond’) is exchanged for another (’bank reserves’), this should not affect expectations of
households’ income stream. Hence, asset prices remain unaffected. A Ricardian equivalence type
argument is furthermore invoked to show that asset purchases by the central bank do not change
households’ overall exposure to desired assets (Woodford, 2012).
This means macroeconomic theory is rather bleak regarding the effectiveness of QE. Shifts in the
supply of bonds are shown to be irrelevant within the frameworks of Wallace (1981) and Eggerts-
son and Woodford (2003). However, there are some newer New-Keynesian models where central
bank asset purchases can affect interest rates. For example, Andrés et al. (2004) incorporate
portfolio adjustment costs and heterogeneous preferences for assets of different maturities into
a DSGE framework and show that central bank asset purchases can impact yields. Chen et al.
(2012) use a similar approach and show that the effectiveness of QE to stimulate the economy
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depends on the degree of market segmentation between short-term and long-term bonds.
Second, there is also skepticism from the perspective of conventional term structure models
of interest rates. In most standard term structure models, demand curves for bonds are flat and
investors view bonds of different maturities as perfect substitutes. Any additional risk associ-
ated with longer term assets is entirely compensated by the term premium. Changes in relative
asset supplies do not affect the assets’ risk nor the risk aversion of investors, hence no portfolio
balancing channel can materialize (Doh, 2010).
So where does the portfolio balance effect come from? It appears in a class of models - so-called
’portfolio balance models’ - that can be traced back to Tobin (1958). By letting risk-averse
households optimise the composition of a portfolio comprising riskless but low-yielding cash and
risky but higher-yielding bonds, Tobin’s model provided a microfoundation for the liquidity pref-
erence, which was a standard component of macroeconomic models at the time. In equilibrium,
lower yields on bonds would elicit a rebalancing of the portfolio towards cash and thereby explain
the inverse relation between the demand for cash and the interest rate on bonds from Keynes’
liquidity preference theory.
Whereas Tobin’s original model dealt with the substitution between money and bonds, port-
folio balance models, in a more general way, describe a class of arbitrage-free models in which
the relative amounts of assets held by investors matter for the term structure of interest rates
and other asset prices. Investors’ objective function optimises the overall return and risk of their
portfolio. This works in a way that expected returns and prices are adjusted to make investors
willing to hold whatever securities are outstanding in each period. In aggregate, total asset
holdings of investors are constrained to be the same as the available exogenous asset supplies of
each asset. Variants of portfolio balancing have been incorporated in Walsh (1982); Piazzesi and
Schneider (2007); Joyce et al. (2011); Neely (2015).
A model presented by Vayanos and Vila (2009) shows how the supply of assets of different
maturities affect the term structure when interest rates are determined through the interaction
of preferred habitat investors and risk averse arbitrageurs with mean-variance preferences. One
of the implications of Vayanos and Vila (2009)’s model is that asset purchases are more effective
in reducing long-term yields when risk aversion of arbitrageurs is high. Variations of Vayanos
and Vila (2009)’s model have been calibrated to US data and find that the change in Treasury
debt supply following QE has predictive power for determining the decline in bond yields (e.g.
Hamilton and Wu, 2012; Greenwood and Vayanos, 2014; Doh, 2010).
Empirically, there seems to be little doubt that asset purchasing programs by major central banks
had at least some effect on yields directly after they were announced. In respect of methodologi-
cal approaches, researchers have used event studies and Vector autoregression (VAR) models, as
well as calibrated Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models (Bhattarai and Neely
(2016)).
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As previously mentioned, event studies that use high frequency data to quantify the changes in
bond yields around QE announcements are particularly popular in the financial market research
of QE. Table 2.2.2 on page 22 provides an overview of such event study findings for US-based
purchase programs. The largest effect is associated with the announcement of the initial QE1
program, which caused US Treasury yields to decline by approx. 100 bps, while subsequent
QE announcements lead to a decline between 14 and 40 bps (see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2012; Gagnon et al., 2011a; Ehlers, 2012).Given the recency of the APP, there is much
less research on the effect of Eurozone QE. Only a few papers study the effects of the ECB’s
asset purchase program (APP) that was announced in January 2015. Event studies quantifying
the effect of the APP on euro area 10-year government bonds estimate that yields declined by
between 30 bps and 70 bps (see Motto et al., 2015; Breckenfelder et al., 2016; De Santis, 2016).
Koijen et al. (2016) show the changes in securities’ holdings of domestic and foreign investors
per asset class, sector and region over the seven quarters following the ECB’s announcement.
They find that the ECB’s purchases of government bonds were mainly accommodated by foreign
investors, who provided 70% of the ECB’s asset purchases, and to a lesser degree by euro area
banks and mutual fund investors. In addition, Koijen et al. (2016) show that insurance com-
panies and pension funds reacted by buying bonds with similar maturities as the ECB, thereby
amplifying the reduction in government bond supply.
Empirical work
Notwithstanding the growing evidence of QE’s role in impacting asset prices, the dominating
channel through which prices are affected and the persistence of effects are controversial. While
many empirical studies associate the impact of QE with the change in asset supply associated
with the portfolio balance effect (see e.g. Neely, 2015; Joyce et al., 2011; Gagnon et al., 2011b;
Stefania and King, 2013)), a few associate the effects with a signaling channel (e.g. Bauer and
Rudebusch, 2014; Bauer and Neely, 2012). Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011a) for
example, find that the signaling channel plays the primary role in the decline of US Treasury
yields in connection to the US-based QE2 program, while the portfolio balancing channel was
responsible for lowering Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) rates and corporate bond yields in
connection to the QE1 program.
US Announced EUR Measured effect per 100 bn EUR Paper
LSAP QE1 Initial announcement 10-year US Treasuries
- 25. November 2008
- 600bn US Dollar MBS 471bn i) -22bs -4.9 bps i) Gagnon et al (2011), Table 1 page 19
ii) - 36bps -7.6 bps ii) Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgenson (2011), p.230
iii)- 23.1bps -4.9 bps iii) Bauer & Neely (2014), p.39 Table 4
LSAP QE1 - 18 March 2009 i) - 47bps - 5.8 bps i) Gagnon et al (2011),Table 1 page 19
750 bn USD MBS 804.6bn ii) - 41 bps - 5.2 bps ii) Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgenson (2011), p.230
300 bn USD US Treasuries iii) - 50.5bps -6.3 bps iii) Bauer & Neely (2014), p.39 Table 4
= 1050 bn USD
Cumulative effect
iv) 91 bps cumulative
across 8 ann. in
baseline events
- 7.1 bps iv) Gagnon et al (2011),Table 1 page 19
v) 107 bps cumulative
across 5 ann. events
vi) -122.8bps - 8.4bps v) Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgenson (2011), p.230
- 9.6bps vi) Bauer & Neely (2014), p.39 Table 4
LSAP QE 2 03-Nov-10 Cumulatively acrossann. 8/10 and
- USD600bn US Treasuries 439.4bn 9/21 2010
i) -30bps -6.8 bps i) Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgenson (2011), p.248*
ii) -40bps - 9.1 bps ii) Ehlers (2012), p.249*
iii) -45 bps - 10.2 bps iii) D’Amico eta l. (2012)
LSAP QE 3 22 Aug 2012 & 13 Sept 2012
- 40bn USD MBS monthly 137.1 bn i) -14.0 bps -10.2 bps i) Bauer and Neely (2014), p.39 Table 4
-40 bn USD US T monthly,
- gradually reduced to 10bn
monthly
- stopped December 2014
Table 2.2: Overview of empirical findings on the impact of US QE on government bonds. Author’s own calculations.
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Other papers try to separate the two effects by comparing event study results with results
implied by a portfolio model. For the UK, Joyce et al. (2011) calibrate a portfolio choice model
to determine the impact of the Bank of England’s purchases on domestic returns for government
and corporate bonds, equities and cash. By estimating a VAR impulse response function, Joyce
et al. (2011) conclude that through the portfolio balance channel, British QE led to a decline in
gilt yields in the range between 30 and 85 bps. Expanding the portfolio model to an international
scale, Neely (2015) evaluates the impact of US QE on international long term interest rates and
exchange rates. He also back-tests his empirical findings with a portfolio model, lending support
to the existence of the portfolio balance channel. Expected foreign returns are adjusted by
expected inflation and expected exchange rate changes, assuming that long run purchasing power
parity holds. The US Fed’s LSAP purchases are introduced through a swap of US government
bonds for the risk-free liquidity asset, leading to declines in domestic and international bond
yields ranging from 35 and 144 bps and a US Dollar depreciation between 3.5% and 7.8%.
An alternative model of portfolio balancing is presented by Christensen and Krogstrup (2017),
who argue that the supply-side induced portfolio balance effect can be amplified by the fact that
QE leads to an expansion of bank balance sheets when transactions are done with non-bank
entities because of additional deposits that are created. The authors refer to this as reserve-side
induced portfolio balance effect of QE and present empirical evidence that the Swiss National
Bank’s asset purchases lowered the yield of the Swiss 10-year bond by 28 bps through this
channel.
Beside the difficulty of disentangling the impact channel of QE announcements, identifying the
information that drives changes in investor behavior is not straightforward either. Greenlaw
et al. (2018) have raised the concern that empirical results derived from event studies may over-
state the effect of QE. The authors doubt that only effects of monetary policy announcements,
rather than other economic news, are measured. Event studies assume that any impact within
the narrow window around an announcement event is solely associated with market participants
reaction to QE announcements. However, when Greenlaw et al. (2018) consider a larger than
usual sample of possible events, they find that announcements by the US Fed have not played a
major role in changing yields and that the initial impact, if measurable, did not persist.
A number of studies has focused on the effect of QE on capital flows to emerging markets (see
e.g. Aizenman et al., 2016; Mishra et al., 2014; Eichengreen and Gupta, 2015). Chen et al. (2012)
show a significant "expansionary impact" of US QE on asset prices in Asia and Latin America
in the short and medium term. Focusing on the tapering announcement of QE, Eichengreen
and Gupta (2015) find strong negative pressure on forex and equity rates in emerging markets,
alluding to capital outflows following QE tapering announcements. According to these authors,
the effect was the more pronounced, the larger and more developed the the emerging market
indicating that investors were able to "better rebalance their portfolio" (ibid., p.1). A similar
result is presented in Aizenman et al. (2016)’s quasi-event study, which finds that financially
developed countries were more significantly impacted by tapering news announcements, as least
in the short term.
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2.3 Agent-based models for contagion modelling
This section provides a brief introduction to the topic of agent-based models (ABM) to illustrate
why this approach is suited for the analysis. Agent-based modelling is a computational methodol-
ogy that focuses on the interaction of autonomous agents within a system. The methodology has
received growing attention in the last two decades, and even more in the wake of the crisis which
has demonstrated a glaring need for new economic models and thinking. While still regarded
with skepticism by the mainstream, ABMs present an alternative approach to the representative
agent paradigm found in general equilibrium models such as DSGE models.
In essence, agent-based models incorporate micro-founded behaviour of rational or bounded-
rational agents, who interact according to a given set of rules. Agents’ decision rules and char-
acteristics are often heterogenous, e.g. in respect of their preferences or expectations. The
agent-based framework is highly suited to include learning behaviour in agents’ decision rules.
Some examples of advanced learning techniques include neural networks or evolutionary algo-
rithms (Bonabeau, 2002). Adaptive behaviour of agents may cause them to evolve and one may
observe unanticipated phenomena that emerge dynamically over time, such as asset price bubbles
or regional segregation of households with similar demographics (Lux, 1995; Boswijk et al., 2007;
Schelling, 1971).
It’s important to note that ABMs come in many forms and that not all agent-based models
include adaption and learning. Applications within economics are particularly prominent for
financial market models and models of networks. This dissertation presents a study of ABM
applications in both of these fields, with PART II being an example of a network ABM of finan-
cial institutions and PART III being the case of a financial market ABM.
ABM applications to financial markets have been successful in the sense that they could repro-
duce stylised empirical facts like fat tails in returns, clustered volatility and herding behavior (see
e.g. LeBaron, 2001; Chen et al., 2012)). There are equilibrium and disequilibrium models in the
literature. Among the latter group, Beja and Goldman (1980) were the first to model a financial
market with a market maker adjusting excess demand stemming from traders with diverging
beliefs about asset prices. Examples of disequilibrium models which build on the distinction
between fundamentalists and chartists include Day and Huang (1990) and Chiarella (1992), who
show that the involvement of chartists/speculators above a certain threshold destabilises the mar-
ket. Farmer and Joshi (2002) present a log-linear price impact function and explain how clustered
volatility can arise with the emergence of different trading strategies. In the group of equilibrium
models, De Grauwe and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) model an exchange rate in the presence of fun-
damentalists and chartists where the proportions of the strategies evolve endogenously over time.
Another literature strand where ABMs are a popular methodological approach is network theory
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(e.g. Amblard, 2002; Tesfatsion, 2006), particularly in respect of modelling endogenous devel-
opment of network structure through adaptive behaviour. An important research question is
concerned with how specific structural features of the network (e.g. size, centrality, intercon-
nectedness) influence the stability of the studied system. In the context of financial systems,
de-stabilising factors concern the propagation (or contagion) of information, portfolio similarity
(e.g. Elliott et al., 2018; Georg et al., 2019), price shocks (Bookstaber et al., 2018), debt de-
faults (Georg, 2013) and liquidation spirals (Calimani et al., 2017). One of the most pressing
questions concerns the identification of conditions that render financial networks prone to either
risk-sharing (i.e. with favorable consequences for stability) or loss amplification (i.e. with un-
favorable consequences for stability). Against this backdrop, a number of network ABMs have
contributed with insightful results and policy recommendations. Applying a dynamic network
model with endogenous network formation (Georg, 2013) shows that in “higher interconnected
networks, shocks will spread more rapidly, which implies a higher fragility of the system once the
tipping point is reached”.3 The author recommends central bank intervention in the short term
due to its stabilising effect on the financial system, but not in the long term. In the case of static
network structure,Ladley (2013) models an exogenous network topology, but endogenous bank
behaviour and interest rate formation to study systemic events in a banking system. He finds
that risk-sharing and amplification depend crucially on the size of the shock. For large shocks, a
network displaying higher connectivity in the form of more inter-bank lending relationships pro-
vides a ‘channel of failure’ and aggravates the situation. For small shocks, however, the author
finds the opposite effect. Furthermore, he finds that a deposit insurance is the most effective
policy to reduce the cost of negative network externalities and thus, benefit network stability.
2.3.1 Complexity and realism vs tractability
ABMs are built from the perspective of looking at the economy as a complex evolving system. It
is common to include a set of realistic and flexible assumptions regarding agents’ behaviors and
interactions. Examples of such assumption can be limited information or bounded rationality.
The realism in agent-based models is an attempt to achieve empirical understanding and repli-
cation (see Tesfatsion, 2006). However, the more one tries to incorporate realistic assumptions
into the model, the more complex the system becomes.
This may lead to over-complicated models featuring multiple equilibria or out-of equilibrium
solutions. Simulation results are not as clear cut as in closed-form solutions and may have am-
biguous comparative statics. This is because ABMs are not required ex-ante to be analytically
solvable. Thus, one of the main criticism ABMs face has to do with their lack of tractability.
We believe it’s important to balance advantages gained from incorporating realistic assumptions
with a a minimum form of tractability in the ABM framework. This is why our spillover model
in PART III is solved numerically through an adaptive algorithm that finds daily market clearing
prices. The simulation converges to a long-term equilibrium which represents the ’steady-state’
we base our analysis on.
3(Georg, 2013, page 27).
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To summarise, agent-based models are an alternative to conventional economic models when
studying problems around heterogeneity, complexity and non-linearity. For our research question
that studies QE-induced spillover effects on financial markets, we believe it to be best approach to
account for heterogeneity in assets and investors. This, as we have seen in the previous chapter,
is absolutely crucial when studying the portfolio balance channel of imperfect asset substitution
associated with QE. In respect of studying spillover effects within financial networks, the agent-
based model in PART II accounts for non-linearity in how shocks propagate through the South
African banking sector. We will present this model in the following chapter.
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PART II - QE and spillover within a network of financial
institutions
This chapter develops the first heterogeneous agent model to investigate financial spillover ef-
fects. More specifically, we analyse the propagation of fire-sale spillovers in the context of QE.
We build on findings presented by Cecchetti et al. (2017) that determine a relationship be-
tween QE and risk-taking behavior by financial institutions. Cecchetti et al. (2017) show that
banks’ leverage in respect of asset-to-equity ratios increased on average for a sample of non-US
banks following QE programs by the US Fed. We conduct a hypothetical exercise and assume
that QE increases SA banks’ leverage after December 2015 and perform a sensitivity analysis
to the leverage parameter in our model to investigate how this may affect banking sector stability.
This chapter contributes to a growing literature on contagion and spillover mechanism in finan-
cial networks. To understand price shock propagation, we implement a model of asset fire-sale
contagion across 29 South African banking institutions. We focus the analysis on the banking
sector due to its central role in the South African financial system. Banks still make up the
largest share of total assets in the South African financial system, even though the non-bank
sector is growing (Kemp, 2017). We simulate shocks on banks’ assets, which trigger 1) a direct
effect corresponding to the change in asset value driven by each bank’s individual exposure and
2) an indirect contagion effect corresponding to the impact of the shock on each individual bank’s
equity through deleveraging of other banks. The model shows how the combination of these two
effects leads to asset sale spillovers across banks. In essence, the paper calibrates a stress-testing
exercise for South African banks and quantifies how the banking sector absorbs asset shocks.
Last, but not least, a discussion of how QE impacts spillover effects completes the analysis.
3 A model of fire-sale propagation for the South African banking
sector
The purpose of this chapter is to calibrate a network model studying price shock amplification
processes to banks’ balance sheet data to determine the conditions under which QE may affect
fire-sale contagion. It’s important to note that this section does not consider QE-induced price
effects, but how QE might influence the conditions for which price shock amplification processes
destabilise a network of banks. Section 3.1 presents Greenwood et al. (2015)’s model of liquida-
tion spirals and extends it by including a cash liquidity buffer. Greenwood et al. (2015)’s original
model abstracts from the fact that banks can use a small fraction of their asset side - their cash,
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albeit low in magnitude - before they are forced to liquidate assets.
Section 3.2 provides an overview of the data set, before general shock scenarios are carried out
in Section 3.3 to demonstrate determinants of systemic risk. Finally, we conduct shock scenarios
in the context of QE and highlight the role of leverage in the analysis. Here we build on findings
from Cecchetti et al. (2017) that show how US QE lead to an increase in foreign banks’ leverage
ratios. The chapter concludes with a summary of results in section 3.5.
The literature most relevant to this chapter deals with the application of fire-sale externality
models to empirical data. Greenwood et al. (2015) have been one of the first to fit an indirect
contagion model to empirical data. Their framework uses a constant holding structure and fixed
leverage ratio to study the effect of a debt haircut for European sovereign bonds on capital losses
in the European banking system. Duarte and Eisenbach (2013) apply Greenwood et al.’s model
to a panel data analysis of US broker-dealer banks to investigate the effect of price declines
in assets financed by repurchase-agreements. They find that a 1% decline in the price of all
assets financed with repos leads to losses owing to fire-sale spillovers accumulating to 8% of
total equity. Greenwood et al. (2015)’s framework is also the basis of Cont and Schaanning
(2017)’s recent stress-test analysis of the European banking sector. They extend the original
framework by introducing asymmetric liquidation behaviour and a concave price impact function
which depends on assets’ market depth and selling volumes. They perform a stress-test on the
European banking sector and show that the quantification of systemic losses based on those kind
of indirect fire-sale contagion effects yields substantially different results to traditional stress-test
methods.
3.1 Model - Extension of Greenwood et al. 2015
3.1.1 Banks’ balance sheets
The starting point for our analysis is the framework of Greenwood et al. (2015). Assume a set
of n banks B = {1, ..., n} and k asset classes K = {1, ..., k}, with K = {C,LB, TB}. We define
a subset of asset classes Cash C = {kc}, trading book assets TB = {1, ..., ktb} and loan book
assets LB = {1, ..., klb}. Each individual bank bi has total assets ai with portfolio weight wk on
asset k such that
∑
k wk = 1. On the liability side, bank i has debt di and equity capital ei,







Cash wkc ai Equity ei
LB wklb ai Debt di
TB wktb ai
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3.1.2 Algorithm
Assume an initial exogenous shock hits the banking system, triggering the following process:1
1. Direct exposure: In time t, every bank holding the shocked assets incurs direct losses which




wi,k,tfk,t for bank bi (3.1.1)
where fk,t ∈ [ -1, 0 ] is the devaluation shock on asset k. The bank can be hit with shocks
on multiple asset classes, which is why the product of the portfolio weight and the shock
value per asset class is summed up before multiplying by total assets ai,t. This impact on
a bank’s assets reduces equity on the liability side, which leads to an increase in the bank’s
leverage ratio. An important assumption of the model is leverage targeting, i.e. banks
maintain a constant leverage ratio over time. This assumption is backed by Adrian and
Shin (2010), who provide some empirical evidence that large financial institutions maintain
fairly stable levels of leverage in the medium term. The change in the binding leverage
ratio2 will prompt banks to become active in the market.
2. Cash buffer : Greenwood et al. (2015) assume that banks immediately pay off debt to return
to their initial leverage ratio li in response to the direct losses. A convenient modelling
feature that follows from their assumption is that portfolio weights of the k assets are
held constant, i.e. banks sell assets in such manner that keeps their portfolio composition
the same throughout the de-leveraging phase. However, we believe it is more realistic to
assume that banks first use their cash liquidity buffer to pay off their debt before liquidating
assets. Thus, portfolio weights are allowed to fluctuate in our model. The critical value
determining the shortfall that bank i needs to cover by de-leveraging is given by
Γi,t : di,t −
(





with Γi,t ∈ [0, di,t] and
Γi,t > 0 if fk,t < 0
Γi,t = 0 if fk,t = 0
The intuition behind equation 3.1.2 is as follows: if the direct exposure is 0 because the
shock is 0%, the shortfall bank i needs to cover is also 0. This is because, in the absence of
a shock on balance sheets, the composition of the liability side does not change, i.e. equity
does not change and the difference between the previous period’s debt and next period’s
debt is also 0. If the shock is negative, the shortfall will be larger than 0 with its maximum
being the previous period’s level of debt.4
1The description of the framework is similar to Duarte and Eisenbach (2013), pp. 5-9
2This constraint is not given by regulators in our simulation. For sake of simplicity, we assume that banks
become active as soon as they move away from initial leverage conditions. An interesting extension of the model
could be to investigate spillover in the case of additional regulatory leverage restrictions.
3It is theoretically possible that equity is wiped out entirely by a very large shock; thus the max operator
limits losses to 0, i.e. there is no negative equity
4One should note here that we define fk,t ∈ [ -1, 0 ].
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3. Fire-sales: For an individual bank i, the algorithm checks two conditions that can occur
in the face of a shock fk,t on its balance sheet. If the shock is too large and cash buffers
are depleted, bank i starts selling assets immediately in proportion to its weights wi,k,t as
in Greenwood et al. (2015)5. In the second case, if the bank is able to absorb the shock,
neither fire-sales nor spillover to other banks occur, but the balance sheet composition
changes in response to how cash is used. To facilitate the reader’s understanding, we
define de-leveraging volumes at three levels: the bank level (i.e. across all asset classes
for bank i), the bank-asset level (i.e. bank i’s selling volumes for only asset k) and the
system-wide de-leveraging of asset k. At the bank level, if the individual shortfall is larger
than the bank’s cash liquidity buffer, the bank’s total de-leveraging amount is determined






























with w̃i,k,· being the adjusted portfolio weight for asset k after cash operations have been
taken into account (see equation ( 3.1.4)).
Thirdly, we sum up the bank-level selling volumes for asset k across all banks to get to the








Note that the first term w̃i,k,· in 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 contains the intermediate adjusted weights
that follow from cash operations. We define their derivation in equation 3.1.10; however,
the adjustment of the liability side is the first in the law of motion as described below.
How are balance sheets adjusted?
Whenever cash liquidity buffers are used, weights are adjusted proportionately according
to the new total assets of bank i, which in turn depend on how equity and debt are affected
by the direct exposure and the pay-off of debt obligations. Equity and debt in t + 1 are
5As in Greenwood et al. (2015), we assume that these selling volumes are accommodated in the market at the
initial step at no price discount
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defined by:




di,t+1 = max{li ei,t+1 ; 0} (3.1.7)
The sum of adjusted equity and updated debt gives total assets of bank i in t+ 1 as
ai,t+1 = max {di,t+1 + ei,t+1, 0} (3.1.8)
On the asset side, cash is reduced by how much of the shortfall Γi,t can be covered. In
t+ 1, its value is determined by debt pay-offs transactions. The maximum amount that is
payable is Γi,t, hence new cash positions in t+ 1 amount to:
ci,t+1 =

0 if Γi,t ≥ ai,twci,k,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
cash liquidity buffer
ci,t − Γi,t else
with ct = ai,twci,k,t
In the case that the cash buffer is not sufficient to de-leverage, ci,t+1 is 0. Alternatively,
the new cash position is the difference between the previous period’s amount and Γi, t.
The next step is the intermediate update of portfolio weights
∑
k wi,k = 1. As in Greenwood
et al. (2015), we assume that asset weights determine how much of each asset is sold in
the de-leveraging process. This assumption is a drastic simplification as selling behaviour
is more complex in real markets. However, it is a necessary building block which helps
to gauge the extent of overlapping portfolios in the sector, while still being simple enough
to allow for data calibration. While in Greenwood et al. (2015), weights are constant, we
allow for fluctuations due to cash transactions. The update process takes place between t
and t + 1, which is why ’intermediate’ adjusted weights are denoted with w̃i,k,·. Starting





Since w̃ci,k,· is smaller than w
c
i,k,t ∀fk,t < 0, the difference needs to be accounted for so that∑
k wk = 1. For sake of simplicity, we distribute the difference proportional to the existing
weights. Consider the correction factor τ =
wci,t−w̃ci,k,·
k−1 , so that the remaining intermediate
weights are given by
wi,k,· = wi,k 6=c,t + τ ∀fk,t < 0 (3.1.10)
To re-iterate the law of motion, the intermediate weights are used in the determination
of fire-sale volumes in the de-leveraging process described in equations 3.1.3 -3.1.5. Once
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transactions materialise, the intermediate weights become the new weights for the period
t+ 1.
System-wide de-leveraging
We now turn to the spillover effects that arise from system-wide de-leveraging. Recall from








The direct exposure of bank i is multiplied by its leverage to determine the shortfall that
bank i needs to cover through asset sales if cash buffers are depleted. This shortfall is
multiplied by asset k’s portfolio weight wi,k,t to determine the proportional amount that
bank i sells of asset k. The sales are summed up over all banks, leading to a total amount
De-leveragingk,t, i.e. the system-wide fire-sales of asset k following the initial shock fk,t.
The equity of bank i is reduced by direct exposure ai,t
∑




4. Price impact : The cumulative sales lead to a price effect υ(ρk,De-leveragingk,t) which
depends on the liquidity parameter ρk and the selling volumes De-leveragingk,t. The as-
sumption is that an exogenous buyer steps in to accommodate the selling volumes at the
fire-sold price.
5. Spillover losses: The price effect leads to further losses on banks’ balance sheets. These are
the indirect spillover losses arising from common asset holdings. Our analysis is particularly
concerned with these kind of spillover losses, as they represent the amplification mechanism
in the centre of the fire-sale contagion channel. It is possible to describe total spillover losses




















where the expression inside the square brackets can be interpreted as second round shock
f∗k on asset k. The routine from 3. is repeated to determine the system-wide losses SPk,t
for asset k, which result only from the second round fire-sale price-shock f∗k . Summing up





In the next step, we capture the fragility of the banking system to fire-sale spillovers by
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Greenwood et al. (2015) call this the Aggregate Vulnerability of the banking system to the preced-
ing shock. It is further possible to break down AV into every bank’s contribution to the overall
losses in the banking system attributable to indirect spillover losses, i.e. AVt =
∑
i Si,t. To
conclude, the systemicness of a bank depends on four factors and is higher, the more connected
the bank is (connectedness is high when the bank owns large illiquid amounts of assets which are
also held by other banks), the bigger the bank, the more leveraged the bank (li) and the larger
the shock the bank faces.
The next section introduces some general characteristics of the South African banking system
and presents the data used in the simulation.
3.2 Data
This section presents a descriptive overview of the data to highlight main attributes of the South
African banking sector. All observations are taken from December 2015. The 29 banks in the
data set own a total of R4.8 tn assets (USD319 bn6), which is about 118% of South Africa’s
nominal GDP.7 A key characteristic of the banking system is its high concentration of assets
among few individual banks. The 4 largest retail banks, Standard Bank (SBSA), First National
Bank FNB, Barclays Africa Group (ABSA) and NEDBANK, account for approx. 78% of total
assets in the sector. The gini coefficient measuring the concentration of assets among market
participants is 0.8, whereas the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is 0.18, indicative of low competi-
tiveness in the sector.
Figure 3.1: Bank size and leverage for 29 South African banks. Leverage is
defined as the ratio of total debt over equity as reported in balance sheets. Dot
sizes correspond to bank size in terms of total assets.
6Exchange rate is 15.0 per USD average for December 2015
7year end 2015
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Figure 3.1 depicts the relationship between banks’ size and leverage ratios. Details about aggre-
gate banking data are also presented in Table 3.7 on page 54: SBSA is the largest bank with
R1.2 tn worth of assets, followed by FNB (R980 bn), ABSA (R927 bn), NEDBANK (R808 bn)
and Investec (R377 bn). The remaining 13 banks account for R480 bn of assets in the sector.
Leverage is defined as the ratio of bank debt over equity and ranges between 12 (FNB) to 15.2
(ABSA) for the 5 largest banks. Although ABSA ranks 3rd in terms of total assets, they hold
the largest amount of household deposits, i.e. R167 bn or 18% of its total balance sheet. This
compares to SBSA having 12%, or R142 bn, of its assets financed by household deposits. It’s
noteworthy that this ratio is nearly 60% (R36 bn) for SA’s fasted growing retail bank CAPITEC.
Banks’ assets are categorised as depicted in Table 3.1 on page 36. We aggregate 23 asset classes,
of which 12 are loan book assets, 9 are trading book assets, one is cash and the remaining assets
are summarised as non-financial assets8. Figure 3.2 on page 35 shows the aggregate composition
of balance sheets according to these overall classes, while Figures 3.3 and 3.5, as well as Figure
3.15 on page 53 show banks’ individual holdings in specific asset classes. The broad compo-
sition of balance sheets is comparable across banks; large retail banks hold more than 70% of
assets in their loan book, the largest share of which can be attributed to household mortgages.
Citibank’s assets are about evenly split between loan book and trading book assets, with corpo-
rate unsecured lending and foreign currency loans as the largest items in the loan book, and SA
government bonds and asset-backed securities as the main components in the trading book. In-
vestment banks DeutscheB, JPM and the micro-credit bank hold a larger share of their portfolio
in the trading book, largely due to their investment in securitisation and asset-backed securities,
as well as in SA treasury bills. In respect of cash, Capitec holds the highest relative share at
5.8%, while other retail banks hold between 2% to 3% of their assets in cash.
8We don’t account for off-balance sheet items due to data availability
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Figure 3.2: Broad composition of banks’ assets. Upper bar chart Absolute vol-
umes of main balance sheet components Non-financial, Cash, Loan book and Trad-
ing book for 29 banks in the sample. Lower bar chart Relative share of main

















Table 3.1: Asset classes
Disaggregation of banks’ balance sheet items in Cash, Non-financial assets, Loan book assets and Trading book assets as reported in BA
900 forms
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Figure 3.3: ABSA and SBSA portfolio weights for Non-financial assets W nf,
Cash W c, Loan book assets Wlbi and Trading book assets Wtbi in clock-wise
direction. The more peripheral, the higher the portfolio share. Weights are 0 in
the centre and increase by 0.05 (5%) per every latitude until a maximum of 0.2
(20%). There is a striking similarity in holding pattern. Both banks have large
exposure in Wlb9, i.e. household mortgage credit, and Wlb10, i.e. Unsecured
corporate lending.
Furthermore, we use radar charts to detect potential holding patterns across the 5 largest retail
banks, as well as African Bank, Capitec and Deutsche Bank. Figure 3.3 on page 37 shows the
individual portfolio weights for ABSA and SBSA as a fraction of their total assets, while Figure
3.5 and 3.15 on page 39 and 53 ’zoom in’ on the remainder of the aforementioned banks. ABSA
and SBSA have striking similarities in the composition of their asset side. Apart from household
mortgages (wlb9 ), ABSA’s and SBSA’s main exposure concerns corporate unsecured lending (wlb10)
with 15% and 11.5% of their assets held in this category, as well as corporate mortgage credit
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(wlb8 ) with portfolio weights of 5.9% and 6.9% respectively. The second largest weight in SBSA’s
portfolio is foreign currency loans (wlb4 ) at 13% of total assets, while "other credit"9 (wlb12) is the
third largest category for ABSA, FNB and INVESTEC, which each investing about 9% of their
balance sheets in this asset class. Furthermore, both FNB and Nedbank’s 4th largest item on
the asset side is household instalment credit (wlb7 ) with about 9% of their balance sheets tied in
this asset class. Nedbank and Investec’s exposure to corporate mortgage credit (wlb8 ) is slightly
higher than the other banks at approx. 9% of total assets. Both AfricanB and Capitec have
Figure 3.4: FNB, Investec and Nedbank portfolio weights for assets W nf, Cash
W c, Loan book assets Wlbi and Trading book assets Wtbi in clock-wise direction.
The more central, the lower the portfolio weight. Weights are 0 in the center and
increase by 0.04 (4%) per every latitude until a maximum weight of 0.16 (16%)
large exposure to household unsecured lending (wlb12) at nearly 60% of their balance sheets, while
having a second dominant asset class. In the case of African Bank, 16% of its assets are in "Other
credit" (wlb12), which includes leasing, credit card and overdraft credit. This means that African
Bank has more than 75% of its balance sheet in asset classes that are sensitive to households’
ability to service debt.
In respect of trading book items, the largest components are SA government bonds (wtb1 ), private
sector bonds (wtb3 ), as well as ’securitisation/asset-backed securities’, derivative instruments and
SA treasury bills (wtb6 to wtb8 ). ABSA has the largest portfolio weight in SA government bonds
(wtb1 , 7.6%), while Investec’s largest exposure is in private sector bonds (wtb3 , 7%). ABSA has
no exposure in securitisation/asset-backed securities (wtb6 ), while SBSA and FNB invest 8.4%
and 7.0% in this asset class respectively. ABSA is the only one of the larger retail banks with
considerable exposure to derivative instruments (wtb7 ), at 8.6% of total assets. Last, but not
least, Nedbank and Investec have 6.1% and 5.2% of their assets invested in wtb8 , i.e. treasury
bills, SA Reserve Bank bills and land bank bills. The radar charts show interesting similarities
between FNB, Investec and Nedbank, and in particular, the role of wlb10, wlb9 , wlb12, and in the case
of Nedbank and Investec, wlb8 . These findings are further summarised in Table 3.2, which shows
large banks’ main asset classes, of which they hold more than 5% as a fraction of their balance
9i.e. the asset class that combines leasing, credit card, overdraft and factoring debt
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sheet. It’s noteworthy that Capitec and African Bank are by far the least diversified retail banks
in terms of their asset side composition.
Figure 3.5: African Bank, Capitec and Deutsche Bank portfolio weights for Non-
financial assets W nf, Cash W c, Loan book assets Wlbi and Trading book assets
Wtbi in clock-wise direction. The more peripheral, the higher the portfolio weight.
Weights are 0 in the center and increase by 0.2 (20%) per every latitude until a
maximum weight of 0.6 (60%).
Table 3.2: Selected banks’ Loan book asset classes. x indicates a proportion
larger than 5% of total assets.
Chapter 3. A model of fire-sale propagation for the South African banking sector 40
Table 3.3: Selected banks’ Trading book asset classes. x indicates a proportion
larger than 5% of total assets. Balance sheet categories as reported in the BA 900
forms.
In light of the events surrounding the bursting of the unsecured lending bubble, it is worthwhile to
have a brief look at the relationship between banks’ holding of unsecured loans and their deposit
sources. This may shed further light onto the interconnectedness between banks and non-banks,
a topic recently emphasized as source of systemic risk. As previously mentioned, the majority
of banks’ deposits stem from the household sector, i.e. on average about 15% of total liabilities
across the 5 largest banks. However, bank deposits can also be attributed to the financial sector,
i.e. coming from insurers, pension funds, money market funds (MMF) and investment funds.
Figure 3.16 on page 54 plots the proportion of assets in unsecured lending against the proportion
of liabilities attributable to MMFs, insurers & pension funds and investment funds’ deposits.
Only banks with deposits larger than 0.1% of total liabilities in a certain category are displayed
in the chart. First, it stands out that African Bank and Capitec have by far the highest exposure
in unsecured lending expressed as a proportion of total assets, which is why they are located in
the upper half of the charts. Second, deposits from insurers and pension funds (lower chart) and
MMFs (upper right chart) only play a minor role. The largest proportion of MMF deposits is
0.03 for both FNB and African Bank. Out of the sample of 29 banks, only 6 banks have MMF
deposits larger than 0.1% of their liabilities. In respect of deposits from insurers and pension
funds, the proportions are also fairly small with a maximum of 0.05, i.e, 5% of total liabilities
held in this form of deposit. In the third category, deposits from investment funds, proportions
are slightly higher. Investec, operating in the asset management segment, has the highest share
with 21% of deposits from investment funds. SBSA, Nedbank and ABSA receive between 10%
and 16% of their liabilities from investment funds’ deposits which is a considerable amount.
Nedbank, for example, has the same relative share of its liabilities in investment funds’ deposits
as it does in deposits from the household sector (16%). ABSA also has 16% of its liabilities
in investment funds’ deposits, which is only 2 percentage points less than the 18% stemming
from household deposits. For SBSA, the relative share of fund manger deposit is 10% of total
liabilities, and for African Banks it’s 17%. Capitec’s interconnectedness in terms of financial
sector deposits is not very large, having 0.3% of liabilities in MMF deposit, 1% in investment
Chapter 3. A model of fire-sale propagation for the South African banking sector 41
fund deposits and 1% in insurer and pension fund deposits. One should note that the intercon-
nectedness between banks and non-banks does not only affect deposits, but also bank bonds held
as securities on the part of non-banks. Figure 3.16 serves merely as a broad indication. Perhaps
the most striking finding is that African Bank still has a high share of liabilities from MMFs and
investment banks in comparison to other banks.
To summarise, section 3.2 reviewed the key characteristics of the South African banking system
and explored similarities in banks’ holding patterns. The sector is highly concentrated with the
4 largest banks holding 78% of assets and displaying similar leverage ratios ranging between
12 and 15 when defined as debt over equity. ABSA and SBSA have a relatively high degree
of matching asset holdings. Nedbank, FNB and Investec are also three institutions which dis-
play similarities in their balance sheet composition. Furthermore, African Bank and Capitec
are the least diversified retail banks and have a high exposure to household unsecured lending
credit. SA government bonds and ’securitisation/asset-backed securities’ are the most important
components of the trading book.
3.3 Simulating fire-sale externalities
In this chapter, we study general shock scenarios to quantify systemic losses arising from the
fire-sale contagion channel. The aim of the simulation is to assess individual banks’ contribution
to overall fragility of the financial system conditional on certain shock scenarios. Furthermore,
the results are used to relate the outcome to structural characteristics of the system.
3.3.1 Parameters
The simulation has N = 29 banks and K = 23 asset classes. The illiquidity parameter ρk, which
determines the knock-on price effects is chosen to be in the same region as in Greenwood et al.
(2015). Greenwood et al. (2015) use 10−13, which means that a selling volume of 10 bn leads
to a price drop of 0,1%, or 10 basis points. The estimate is empirically found in studies from
the European bond market (see Duffie, 2010). The sensitivity analysis in the second part of the
chapter shows that this is a reasonable parameter.
Scenario 1: The largest bank suffers defaults in its unsecured lending portfolio
3.3.2 Selection of shocks
This section describes the shock scenarios conducted to identify determinants of banking sector
fragility. We start by shocking a loan portfolio of an individual bank and move on to shocks to
the marketable portfolio.
Individual bank
The largest bank in the system is SBSA with approx. R1.2 tn total assets. As the unsecured
lending category is the part of the loan book that is most exposed to defaults, we study knock-on
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Figure 3.6: Systemic asset losses over multiple rounds following a shock on
SBSA’s household unsecured lending portfolio. Left: Initial de-valuation shock
is 10%. Middle: 20% de-valuation Right: 50% de-valuation. Lower charts show
the effect of on total assets in the banking system (1 is 100% pre-shock assets).
Source: Author’s simulation based on SARB BA 900 forms’ balance sheet data.





















Figure 3.7: Cash liquidity buffers as a proportion of total pre-shock cash posi-
tions. For example, a 10% shock on SBSA’s wlb11 leads to a decline of total banking
system cash reserves to 80% of total pre-shock cash reserves. Source: Author’s
simulation based on SARB BA 900 forms’ balance sheet data.
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effects from a devaluation shock of -10%, -20% and -50%. The number of periods post-shock
is large enough so that the system reaches a steady state. Results are shown in Figure 3.6. In
all three cases, systemic losses peak in the first iteration post-shock and level off in subsequent
periods. As can be seen in the chart, a 10% shock leads to systemic asset losses of 0.1 × 1011,
i.e. R 10 bn following the initial impact. This figure increases to 0.5× 1011 (R 50 bn) for a 20%
shock (middle chart) and 1.6× 1011 (R 160 bn) for a 50% shock (top right chart), respectively.
These losses can be attributed to Standard Bank’s direct exposure to defaults in the unsecured
lending segment, as well as to deleveraging effects on the part of other banks. The cumulative
effect on total assets as a share of pre-shock assets in the banking system is shown in the lower
charts in Figure 3.6. A 10% shock reduces pre-shock banking system assets by 1%, a 20% shock
by 3% and a 50% shock by 7%. Thus, from the perspective of a fire-sale contagion channel,
defaulting unsecured loans on the part of SBSA have a muted effect on the stability in the South
African banking sector overall. This finding can be explained by inspecting banks’ cash reserves
and individual selling behaviour.
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Figure 3.8: Asset sales per bank over multiple rounds. Initial impact is a 10%
(left chart) and a 50% (right chart) de-valuation shock on wlb11 of SBSA. Color
shades range from 0 to R1 bn. Source: Author’s simulation based on SARB BA
900 forms’ balance sheet data.
Figure 3.7 on page 42 displays the evolution of cash liquidity reserves in the banking system for a
given shock. De-leveraging by fire-selling assets only occurs if individual banks’ cash buffers are
fully depleted. Furthermore, the heat map in Figure 3.8 above shows the occurrence of fire-sales
by each bank. The darkest colour displays asset sales in the order of R1 bn and shades reach a
lighter colour every R200 m. For a small price shock of -10% (left chart), only SBSA is forced to
de-leverage by selling assets. All other banks display no occurrence of fire-sales because feedback
price effects are small enough to be absorbed by banks’ liquidity buffers. In a large shock sce-
nario of 50% devaluation on SBSA’s wlb11, however, there are fire-sale externalities which cause
losses across financial institutions and asset classes, i.e. BNP, JP Morgan (JPM), Deutsche Bank
(DeutscheB) and Bank of China (BoC), who ’dump’ assets on the market because they no longer
can use cash to pay back debt contracts necessary to de-leverage their balance sheet size. One
should note that large retail banks ABSA, FNB, Investec and Nedbank are unaffected, even in
the large shock scenario. This is the primary reason why systemic losses are muted overall in
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Figure 3.6.
Multiple banks
In the next step, we shock the price of wtb1 to stress-test banks’ resilience to South African
government bond price shocks. SA government bonds are particularly sensitive to perceived
political risk. For example, a sudden price decline could occur if a large number of international
investors exits this security class on account of higher expected default risk on the part of the
South African government.
Consider Figure 3.9 below which shows the volatility of the 10-year Government Bond (R186).
Within the last 20 years, there were extreme price movements on 4 days: a 20% price drop on
28 January 2004 and 4 January 2008, as well as a 30% and 20% increase on 13 November 2006
and 23 January 2015, respectively.















SA Government bond price volatility
Figure 3.9: Left chart: R186 10-year bond daily price index. Right chart: Daily
returns
We take these extreme values as orientation for our marketable asset shock simulations. In Fig-
ure 3.10, we see that a 10%, 20% and 50% shock on wtb1 leads to systemic losses of 11% and 21%
of total assets in the banking sector after 4 iterations. Hypothetically, an even larger shock of
50% sees total assets in the system drop to about 49%. These sizable effects can be attributed
to the fact that the initial impact hits all banks (instead of just one as in the previous scenario),
which have to de-leverage as their cash liquidity buffers are not enough to down-size their balance
sheets (see also Figure 3.7 on page 42). Hence, in all three scenarios, cash buffers are depleted
after the first price shock hits balance sheets. One should note here that price drops in SA
government bonds and sharp declines in banks’ cash reserves will lead to additional stress from
the perspective of banks’ liquidity requirements. These liquidity-related stress dynamics are not
explicitly modeled in this paper.
Scenario 2: Price shocks on SA government bonds
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Figure 3.10: Systemic losses over multiple post shock iterations, wtb1 all banks.
Left: All banks suffer a 10% price shock on their holdings of wtb1 (SA government
bonds). Middle: All banks suffer a 20% price shock on wtb1 . Right: All banks
suffer a 50% price shock on wtb1 . Lower charts show the effect of the shock on total
assets in the banking system (as a fraction of pre-shock assets). Source: Author’s
simulation based on SARB BA 900 forms balance sheet data.
Table 3.4: Aggregate Vulnerability. Fraction of banking system equity wiped
out in response to shock ft−1 by banks’ fire-selling
Period AV
1 to 2 -16.50%
2 to 3 -5.60%
3 to 4 -1.50%
4 to 5 -0.40%
5 to 6 -0.10%
6 to 7 -0.03%
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Table 3.4 quantifies the knock-on effects arising from fire-sale externalities for the large shock
scenario of a 50% price drop of SA government bonds. AV is the Aggregate Vulnerability, i.e.
the percentage of total banking system equity wiped out only by feedback price effects. Equity
losses from fire-sale externalities dissipate sharply after the second iteration and reach a steady
state in period 7.
The question arises as to which bank contributes more to systemic losses under the displayed
shock scenarios. To shed light on this, the heat map in Figure3.11 displays fire-sales for each
bank for the 10% and 50% shock on SA government bonds. Feedback price effects are caused
mainly by banks in the upper chart, with the heaviest and most prolonged selling occurring for
the largest banks ABSA, SBSA, Nedbank, FNB, Investec. African Bank does not experience any
stress in the small shock scenario, but contributes to systemic losses in excess of R2 bn given a
-50% shock. Interestingly, Capitec does not liquidate any of its assets even in the large shock
scenario, which can be attributed to two reasons. First, they have no asset holdings in wtb1 , and
thus, no direct exposure to the initial shock. Second, the feedback price effects, which occur
in subsequent iterations and which affect other asset classes as well, are absorbed by their cash
buffers.
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Figure 3.11: Asset sales per bank post-shock. All banks holding SA Government
bonds in their investment book are affected by a 10% (left chart) and 50% (right
chart) price shock on wtb1 . Upper chart shows asset sales for the 15 largest banks.
Color shades range from 0 to R10 bn. Source: Author’s simulation based on SARB
BA 900 forms’ balance sheet data.
Furthermore, it is important to relate the impact of price shocks to direct and indirect effects in
the stress-test simulation. For this purpose Table 3.5 shows banks’ contribution to total banking
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Table 3.5: Bank’s relative contribution to direct and indirect systemic equity
losses in the 50% shock scenario on wtb1 . The direct impact is the initial 50% price
shock to all banks holding wtb1 (SA government bonds). ABSA suffers largest direct
losses (30% of all). The indirect contagion arises from banks’ de-leveraging and
fire-selling. SBSA suffers largest indirect equity losses (30% of all banking system
equity losses) in each feed-back round. Note that only the 12 largest contributors
are shown.
Direct impact Indirect contagion effect
SBSA 21% SBSA 30%
NEDBANK 10% NEDBANK 22%
FNB 22% FNB 21%
ABSA 30% ABSA 12%
INVESTEC 7% INVESTEC 8%
CITYBANK 6% CITYBANK 0%
JPM 0.2% JPM 1%
HSBC 0.4% HSBC 1%
BoC 1% BoC 1%
AfricanB 0.2% AfricanB 1%
CHARTERED 1% CHARTERED 1%
CAPITEC 0% CAPITEC 1%
sector equity losses for the two categories. ABSA suffers the largest equity losses from the initial
impact (30% of total), which can be explained by their large direct exposure to wtb1 highlighted
in the data section. Nedbank’s direct losses from the price shock are about 10% of total system
equity losses, while SBSA’s and FNB’s direct losses account for 21% and 22% of total direct losses
respectively. However, in respect of indirect losses arising from the fire-sale externality channel,
SBSA ranks first with a 30% contribution to total losses and ABSA ranks fourth, accounting for
12% of total system equity losses. Nedbank’s role in the de-leveraging rounds is more pronounced,
representing the second most systemic bank in this respect, and is one notch above FNB and
below SBSA. The reason for SBSA and Nedbank being more important for feedback price effects
can be attributed to their leverage and connectedness, i.e. they own large amount of assets also
held by other banks.
3.3.3 Sensitivity analysis
The stress-test simulations in the previous section have shown that large government bond price
shocks lead to sizable equity losses in the South African banking system due to de-leveraging
behaviour of banks. When modelling feedback price effects, however, it’s important to inspect
the sensitivity of results to parameter variation. The fire-sale externalities measured in the simu-
lation depend on the illiquidity parameter ρ used to determine feedback price drops as a function
of selling volumes. Hence, we repeated the shock simulation for a wide range of illiquidity pa-
rameters. Figure 3.12 shows the cumulative effect on total equity in the banking sector given
a 10%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 90% shock on SA government bond prices and conditional on the
illiquidity parameter. For example, a 50% shock (blue line) at 4 × 10−14 leads to cumulative
equity losses of 41%. However, the same shock leads to 100% banking system equity losses for a
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parameter exceeding 3× 10−13.
As the chart shows, there is a critical value for the illiquidity parameter at which the slope for
cumulative losses increases sharply across all shock scenarios, i.e. 1 × 10−13. If the price effect





















































































































Figure 3.12: Cumulative banking system equity losses conditional on illiquidity
parameter; following a 10%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 90% shock on SA government
bond prices.
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3.4 QE Scenario
Scenario 3: 20% price decline in SA government bonds under higher leverage









































 Shock -20%, wtb1
Figure 3.13: Equity losses for increased leverage ratios and a 20% SA Govern-
ment bond price shock. Left chart: System-wide equity losses at each liquidation
step Right chart: System-wide cumulative equity losses
As demonstrated in Section 3.3.2, a 20% price decline is an extreme scenario which resulted
in substantial bank de-leveraging. The green line in Figure 3.13 shows the effect under the
conditions found in the data. Given those leverage ratios, fire-sale contagion erases approximately
22.5% of equity in the system. The initial impact accounts for about 13% of those losses, while
feedback amplification effects compound losses in the magnitude of 9%. If all banks displayed a
10% higher leverage, cumulative equity losses would amount to a marginally higher 28%. The
selling patterns for the case of the 10% higher leverage are similar to those of the leverage present
in the data.
However, the picture changes for a situation where banks display 50% more leverage. Indirect
amplification losses are now much higher than losses from the initial impact. Fire-sale contagion
contributes to two thirds of total losses, leading to high banking sector instability. This is because
the relative higher leverage of the large banks means that they need to de-leverage a much larger
critical amount to keep their (now higher) debt-to-equity ratio constant. Naturally, this raises
the question as to how much leverage is too much. To investigate this, we conducted a range of
simulation while varying the shock size and the leverage parameter. The results can be seen in
Figure 3.14 which shows how total banking sector assets evolve (y-axis) following an initial price
shock to SA government bonds (line graphs) and varying leverage from 0 to 2.5 times the current
leverage present in the data (x-axis). One should note that the price shocks are artificially high
for demonstration purposes. While the upper chart ’zooms’ in on leverage ratios smaller than
1.0 times the current ratios, the lower chart shows what happens in the range from 1.0 to 2.5
times the current levels. It becomes apparent that the risk to banking sector asset losses are
not linear, but increase exponentially with higher leverage ratios. Considering the lower chart
and price declines from 10% to 30%, a system with 1.5 times current levels is very exposed. If
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one considers banks’ leverage ratios that are twice as high as current levels, price shocks become
catastrophic to the system.
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Figure 3.14: Sensitivity analysis of the leverage parameter. X-axis depicts x
times the current leverage in the banking system. Y-axis shows asset losses relative
to pre-shock total assets in the sector. Upper chart: Leverage ratios are 0 to 0.8
times larger than current ratios. Lower chart: Leverage ratios are 0 to 2.5 times
larger than current values. Line graphs are hypothetical shock scenarios ranging
from 10% to 90% price decline to government bonds.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter used a model-based approach to show how spillovers within the South African
banking sector arise from fire-sale externalities. A detailed description of banks’ balance sheets is
used in a complementary fashion to give insight into the distribution of banks’ asset holdings. The
presentation of tables illustrates patterns of asset holdings which can be used to determine the
exposure of individual banks’ portfolios to asset write-downs. In the main section we calibrated a
model of asset fire-sale propagation to South African balance sheet data to investigate spillovers
arising from a specific channel of contagion. Banks are ’forced’ to liquidate part of their portfolio
given a large enough price shock, as they are subject to a maximum leverage constraint. We follow
Greenwood et al. (2015) and model this constraint as constant leverage constraint, but include
a consideration of a cash liquidity buffer in banks’ decision rule. We show how the liquidity
buffer contributes to shock absorption in our simulation study. A second factor conducive to
shock absorption is the fact that the banking system displays a relatively high concentration
with the largest 4 banks comprising nearly 80% of assets. It was shown that large defaults to the
household mortgage credit portfolio of one of those banks did not lead to feedback amplification
losses.
However, we also demonstrate that the banking sector is more exposed to fire-sale externalities
in the event of large price shocks to a marketable asset. Focusing our analysis on South African
government bonds, we show that most banks are able to absorb price shocks up to a critical
threshold illiquidity. Last, but not least, we have shown that the fire-sale contagion channel
becomes much more pronounced in the context of QE. The same shock to the government bond
asset class leads to much higher banking sector instability, assuming that QE leads to a condition
of banks taking up higher leverage.
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3.6 Annex - PART II
Table 3.6: Asset classes. Banks’ asset side has 23 components. Author’s classi-
fication of categories reported in the SARB’s BA 900 forms.
Weight Asset class
wc Cash
wlb1 SA Interbank deposits, loans and advances
wlb2 Rand Deposits with and loans to foreign banks
wlb3 Loans granted under repo agreement
wlb4 Foreign currency loans and advances
wlb5 Redeemable preference shares
wlb6 Corporate instalment credit
wlb7 Household instalment credit
wlb8 Corporate mortgage credit
wlb9 Household mortgage credit
wlb10 Unsecured lending corporate
wlb11 Unsecured lending household
wlb12 Other credit (i.e. Credit card + leasing + Overdarft + factoring debt)
wtb1 Central and provincial government bond
wtb2 Other public-sector bonds
wtb3 Private sector bonds
wtb4 Equity holdings in subsidiaries and joint ventures
wtb5 Listed and unlisted equities
wtb6 Securitisation/ asset-backed securities
wtb7 Derivative instruments




c Cash , wtbi Trading book asset, wlbi Loan book asset,
wnfNon-financial assets
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Figure 3.15: Bank portfolio weights for Non-financial assets W nf, Cash W c,
Loan book assets Wlbi and Trading book assets Wtbi. The more peripheral, the
higher the portfolio weight. Weights are 0 in the center and increase by 0.2 (20%)
per every latitude until a maximum weight of 0.6 (60%). Asset weights wc, wlbi ,
wtbi , wnf
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Table 3.7: Selected banks aggregate data. Observation as of 31 December 2015
as reported the SARB’s BA900 forms. Total assets in R bn, Leverage ratio (debt
over equity), Loan book aggregates all loan book balance sheet items, trading book
aggregates all balance sheet items held for investment.











SBSA 1,213.5 13.1 86.2 1,127 142.3 0.12 0.74 0.21
FNB 979.9 12.0 75.5 904 150.3 0.15 0.74 0.21
ABSA 926.5 15.2 57.3 869 166.7 0.18 0.73 0.21
NEDBANK 808.7 13.0 57.7 751 131.7 0.16 0.79 0.15
INVESTEC 377.0 14.5 24.3 353 64.8 0.17 0.71 0.27
CITYBANK 76.5 13.9 5.1 71 - - 0.49 0.50
CAPITEC 62.0 3.7 13.1 49 36.5 0.59 0.85 0.07
AfricanB 57.9 6.8 7.5 50 0.1 0.00 0.80 0.11
JPM 57.0 16.6 3.2 54 - - 0.33 0.65
HSBC 49.8 11.7 3.9 46 - - 0.50 0.46
Chartered 38.4 9.4 3.7 35 - - 0.53 0.40
BoC 35.6 7.5 4.2 31 0.1 0.00 0.91 0.07
DeutscheB 22.8 14.9 1.4 21 - - 0.28 0.72
BNP 14.5 21.8 0.6 14 - - 0.55 0.44
SocieteG 11.7 16.6 0.7 11 - - 0.54 0.44
Grindrod 11.3 12.5 0.8 10 5.4 0.48 0.81 0.09
Figure 3.16: Financial sector deposits vs Unsecured lending. The x axis displays
each banks’ proportion of total liabilities attributable to deposits from Investment
funds/Fund manager (top left chart), Money Market Funds(top right) and Insurers
and Pension Funds (bottom chart). The y axis shows proportion of assets tied in
unsecured lending.
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PART III - QE and spillover effects on financial markets
4 A spillover model with heterogeneous agents and assets1
In PART III we shift the focus from spillovers within financial networks to asset price spillovers
that operate through the portfolio balance channel of QE. At the center of the portfolio balance
channel is the assumption that assets are imperfect substitutes for investors, e.g. due to seg-
mented markets, regulation restricting the type of asset that can be bought or home bias, i.e.
the preference to hold domestic assets. To accommodate this, we present an agent-based model
specifically designed to incorporate heterogeneity in assets and agents. The model is developed
in the next section and in Chapter 5, we conduct policy experiments to quantify the effect of
Eurozone QE on international asset returns.
4.1 Model framework
This section presents a dynamic heterogeneous agent model that was specifically developed to
account for heterogeneity in assets and agents. In its present form, we introduce a two-country
set up, but the framework can be extended to feature more countries as well.
The model schematized in Figure 4.1 comprises the following: country D populated by investor
agents d ∈ {1, 2, ..., nd} and country F populated by investor agents f ∈ {1, 2, ..., nf}. Both
countries have local financial markets in which investors can trade shares of asset portfolios
D ∈ {1, 2, ..., nD} issued in country D and F ∈ {1, 2, ..., nF } issued in country F . Introducing
portfolios of assets instead of individual assets reduces computational complexity and facilitates
a parsimonious modeling of asset maturity. Capital can flow freely between the two countries
at endogenous exchange rates XDF and XFD, with XFD = 1/XDF . The exchange rate XDF
defines the number of units of country D’s currency that can be purchased with one unit of
country F ’s currency. Thus an increase in XDF corresponds to an appreciation of country F ’s
currency vis-à-vis country D’s currency. A central bank agent in country D can intervene in
financial markets by buying and selling shares in portfolio D.2 In the following we describe
agent behavior from the point of view of an agent from country D, which we will refer to as the
domestic country. We will furthermore not use superscripts D and F to indicate a domestic or
foreign portfolio in equations that apply to portfolios of both countries.
1This chapter is part of the working paper Koziol et al. (2019), ’Euro Area Quantitative Easing in a Portfolio
Balance Model with Heterogeneous Agents and Assets’
2We assume that only the domestic central bank does QE.













asset portfolios (D) asset portfolios (F)
Figure 4.1: Model overview.
4.1.1 Sequence overview
To help the reader understand model dynamics before going into a detailed description, we
present the algorithm in a simplified form in Figure 4.2.
The timing of the model includes two separate loops: an inter-day loop that governs the events
from day t to t+ 1 and an intra-day loop which finds market clearing prices. At the start of the
day, investors form expectations about asset returns and optimise their portfolio according to
mean-variance preferences. A recursive log impact price function adjusts prices until a stopping
criteria δ is satisfied, meaning that demand and supply come sufficiently close. Our model
features simultaneous clearing of three markets: the domestic market, the foreign market and
the exchange rate market. Subsequent to finding equilibrium prices, transaction take place and
balance sheets are adjusted. Profit and maturity related factors occur overnight, before the
sequence starts again. Eventually, the algorithm converges to a long-term steady state.
Figure 4.2: Model timing.
We will now proceed with the description of agents and assets.
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4.1.2 Investor balance sheets






















with Qd,t ∈ R+ denoting the quantity of shares held in a portfolio by agent d at time t and
Pt being the market price of one share in the portfolio. Agents can hold cash in domestic and
foreign currency (CDd,t and C
F
d,t) and fund themselves through capital Sd,t, which they receive as
an endowment in t = 0. For the sake of simplicity, we abstract from any liability side management
by agents. We thereby assume that any portfolio balancing is, on average, not due to adjustments
in the capital structure of agents.
4.1.3 Heterogeneous assets
The asset portfolios of a country can differ with regard to their maturity structure, as well as
the default rate of underlying assets. As agents consider expected real returns, the location of
the asset portfolio determines its inflation risk.
Defaults
We assume that a fraction Ω of the asset portfolio instantly defaults overnight. Default risk is
one of two exogenous risk factors that enter the model, the other one being inflation. We model
defaults as stochastic process whose distribution is known by investor agents. See section 5.1.4
on page 71 and Equation 5.1.2 on page 71 for more details.
Inflation
Agents consider expected real returns, so inflation risk enters the model by deflating expected
nominal returns by an expected inflation rate which is modeled as a simple normally distributed
random variable πt ∼ N (E[π], σπ) with constant mean and variance. We describe in section 5.1.4
how we calibrate inflation risk to the domestic and foreign market.
Maturity
Maturity is introduced through an exogenously set repayment rate (1−m) on outstanding assets
in a portfolio. The parameter m ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as a maturity parameter, with m = 0
meaning that all assets inside the portfolio mature overnight, whereas m = 1 would entail that
assets never mature.3
3Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) pioneered this one-parameter model of maturity within a standard macro
model. However, rather than assuming a constant repayment rate on bonds, they assume a perpetual bond with
constantly declining coupon payments. Bond duration is computed with the Macaulay definition of duration,
which focuses on cash flow rather than redemption. Our modeling of maturity is identical to that in Riedler and
Brückbauer (2017).
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Figure 4.3: Exemplary maturity structures of a portfolio of assets for different
values of m.
Figure 4.3 exemplarily shows the maturity structure of portfolios for different values of m. The
higher the m, the lower the repayment rate (1 − m), the longer it takes for the portfolio to
mature. Given m = 0.996, for example, the asset portfolio will have (hypothetically) matured
approximately after 5 trading years from the current point in time. Note that although assets
mature, the overall supply of outstanding shares is held constant by introducing an underwriter
agent who instantly re-issues the maturing portfolio shares. This is a convenient way for us to
deal with maturity risk without having to model maturity dates over time.
Section 5.4.1 in the appendix is devoted to a more detailed discussion on the appropriateness of
modeling maturity through a constant repayment rate and its relation to the term structure of
interest rates.
4.1.4 Asset performance
For an overview of performance-related variables, consider the following table:
ΠDt profit per portfolio share V D nominal value of portfolio
Q̄D portfolio shares issued PDt price of portfolio share
ρD interest on portfolio share Ωt default rate
m maturity parameter (1−m) constant repayment rate
out t percentage outstanding mat t percentage maturing
Table 4.1: Performance related variables for asset portfolios
There are five effects that can have an impact on an investor agent’s performance. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that the events associated with these effects, i.e. interest payments,
principal repayments, defaults, price movements and exchange rate movements, happen overnight
(i.e. in the logical second before period t) and become public knowledge at the beginning of each
period. We can compute the profit Πd,t that has accrued overnight by adding the performance
effects associated with each portfolio share and unit of cash, i.e.




















Not all shares of a portfolio of assets are subject to the same performance effects. For the sake
of a clearer presentation, we define three factors that indicate these different shares:
- The factor out t defines the percentage of performing outstanding portfolio shares at the
beginning of period t relative to the portfolio shares held at the end of period t− 1.
- We define the factor mat t as the percentage of performing portfolio shares that matured
overnight.
- all t defines all performing portfolio shares, i.e. those that have not defaulted overnight
So that
out t := m(1− Ωt)
mat t := (1−m)(1− Ωt)
all t := out t + mat t = (1− Ωt)
Note that the factors are time-dependent because they take into account the stochastic default
rate of assets in a portfolio. The profit that accrues for one share in a portfolio denominated in

















− ΩDt PDt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
default effect
(4.1.2)
For the sake of simplicity, the face value of the assets in a portfolio V , the total number of
portfolio shares Q̄ and the interest rate ρ paid per portfolio share are modelled as constants.4 We
furthermore assume that the loss given default of assets in the portfolio is 100%, i.e. shareholders
incur losses of Pt−1 for each defaulting portfolio share. The principal repayments and interest
payments depend on the face value of a portfolio share, not its past valuation. When considering
portfolios denominated in foreign currency, exchange rate movements between t − 1 and t will
influence the repayment and price effect. Interest rates will be valued at the current exchange
























−ΩFt XDFt−1PFt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
default effect
, (4.1.3)
4An exogenous underwriter-agent, which instantly reissues defaulting and maturing assets is introduced in
Section 4.1.7 in order to keep face values and quantities of portfolio shares constant.
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While all cash positions pay an interest rate, the valuation of foreign cash positions are also









CF +XDFt −XDFt−1 . (4.1.4)
For the sake of simplicity, we model interest rates payed on cash in their respective currency as
constants ρCD and ρCF .
Given the profit Πd,t agent d accrued overnight, the first decision an agent has to make is
whether to retain or to pay profits out to shareholders. In order to avoid dealing with economic
growth issues within the model, we assume that all performance effects that materialise in a
period (i.e. all, expect for the price effect) are paid out to shareholders. Payouts are made in


































The law of motion for the value of capital amounts to:
Sd,t = Sd,t−1 + Πd,t −DDd,t −XDFt DFd,t. (4.1.6)
4.1.5 Expectation Formation
Realised nominal returns on a portfolio share can be computed by dividing the profit per share
that accrued overnight by last period’s price. Taking into account an exogenous stochastic
process for domestic and foreign inflation πDt and πFt respectively and defining Ed,t[·] as agent
d’s expectation of the variable in brackets at time t, the expected real returns of domestic and































































Since nominal profits in period t + 1 depend on prices, exchange rates and default rates that
only materialise overnight, agents need to form expectations regarding their realisation. All other
variables are assumed to be constant by agents. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that agents
know the stochastic process behind default rates, i.e. Ed,t[Ωt+1] = µΩt , with µΩt being the first
5When payouts are negative, agents do not receive funds, but rather retain future positive payouts until losses
have been compensated.
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moment of the true default rate process.6 We furthermore assume that agents are myopic and
believe in efficient asset markets, i.e. Ed,t[Pt+1] = Pt. Exchange rates expectations, on the other
hand, are anchored in economic fundamentals.7 Agents believe the exchange rate will eventually
revert to the purchasing power parity (X̄DFt ):
E
d,t










[X̄DFt+1 ] = X̄







The parameter η, which, for instance, depends on the responsiveness of a country’s exports and
imports to changes in exchange rates, defines the expected convergence speed towards the pur-
chasing power parity. Expectations of purchasing power parity change with changes in expected
inflation. In order to take into account the risk of their investments, agents compute estimates
of variance and covariances of historic real returns. We generally define an agent’s estimate of
the covariance between variables rx and ry as
ˆCovd,t(r
x, ry) := M̂d,t
[(









M̂t[x, φ] := (1− φ)M̂t−1[x, φ] + φxt, (4.1.11)
defining the exponentially weighted moving average of variable x. The parameter φ ∈ [0, 1]
determines how much weight is given to the most recent observation.
4.1.6 Balance Sheet Optimisation
Investor agents optimise their asset holdings by computing the relative weights of the portfolios
on their balance sheet, that optimises a mean variance utility function:







w ≥ 0 and w′1 = 1, (4.1.13)















′ being the N × 1 vector of expected returns and Σd be-





d,t are themselves vectors containing the optimal weights of n
D domestic asset
portfolios wDd,t, n





6Including heterogeneous expectations about default rates is feasible within the model. We refrain from im-
plementing them because it would require nd  1, which substantially increases computation time with apparent
benefit for the simulations conducted.
7When agents believe that the expected exchange rate movement is zero, i.e. Ed,t[XDFt+1 ] = XDFt , it can easily
be shown that the expected return of an investment in a foreign asset is independent of the exchange rate level.
This would lead to unrealistic exchange rate dynamics with excessive volatility.





d,t+1] and Ed,t+τ [r
C
d,t+1] are themselves vectors of the corresponding expected
returns.












being 1×nD, 1×nF and 1×2 vectors specifying the risk aversion assigned to individual domestic
and foreign portfolios, as well as domestic and foreign currencies, respectively. Including asset
specific risk aversions is a simple way to account for idiosyncratic preferences of agents for certain
assets that cannot be explained by their risk-return profile nor associated transaction costs. The
substitutability of available assets crucially depends on agents’ preferences for certain maturities,
asset types (e.g. equities vs. bonds) and issuer nationality (home bias).
Equation (4.1.13) contains two constraints: a no-short-selling constraint8 and a budget constraint
(the sum of weights must be equal to 100%).















 CDd,t−1(1 + ρCD)︸ ︷︷ ︸





























Note that demand is the difference between the desired balance sheet position (resulting
from the optimal weights) and its inventory at the start of period t. For portfolios, the inventory
is simply the quantity held at the end of last period reduced by shares that have defaulted
or matured overnight, while for currency the inventory takes into account overnight interest
payments, principal repayments and payouts.
4.1.7 Price and Exchange Rate Adjustments
In equilibrium, prices and exchange rates need to take values that simultaneously clear the mar-
kets of nD domestic portfolios, nF foreign portfolios and two currencies. Achieving simultaneous
market clearing can be challenging with standard numerical techniques. We circumvent these
challenges by employing a price-setting algorithm that takes into account the economic intuition
that excess demand should increase prices and excess supply should reduce them. The flow
chart in Figure 4.4 illustrates how the algorithm, which we adopt from Riedler and Brückbauer
(2017), works for any variable Vt for which economic intuition (formulated as a recursive impact
function) informs the direction in which that variable is updated. In case of price adjustments,
8We follow Levich et al. (1999) with this assumption, who argue that short selling plays only a minor role in
real funds’ investment decisions.
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we use the following impact function starting with last period’s prices (Pt∗ = Pt−1):9











∆Qf,t∗ + ∆QU,t + ∆QCB,t (4.1.19)
being excess demand (excess supply if ∆Qt∗ < 0) for a portfolio of assets at the hypothetical price
of Pt∗ . Expectations of returns Ed,t∗ [rt+1] and prices Ed,t∗ [Pt+1], covariance estimates ˆCovt∗(·),
payouts Dd,t∗ and balance sheet size Sd,t∗ all need to be updated with the hypothetical price
when computing demand. Excess demand in Eq. (4.1.18) is normalised by the total quantity
of portfolio shares Q̄ in circulation for a more convenient calibration of the intensity parameter
γ .10
Monetary policy enters the model through the central bank agent’s demand ∆QCB,t for assets
in Eq. (4.1.19), while an exogenous underwriter agent reissues maturing and defaulting portfolio
shares by supplying ∆QU,t ≤ 0. Note that neither the central bank demand nor the underwriter
supply change during the iterative price setting algorithm. The demand of the central bank
depends on its inventory QCB,t−1 and the amount Q∗CB,t it desires to hold in period t, i.e.
∆QCB,t = Q
∗
CB,t − out tQCB,t−1. (4.1.20)
The underwriter agent, on the other hand, will supply all portfolio shares in its inventory and
all shares that have matured or defaulted overnight:
∆QU,t = −
(
out tQU,t−1 + (mat t + Ωt)Q̄
)
(4.1.21)
The exchange rate is updated using the same iterative algorithm used to adjust price, but with
the following recursive logarithmic impact function initialised at XDFt∗ = XDFt−1 :
log(XDFt∗ ) = log(X
DF










9We add a star to the index of variables to differentiate between values within and outside of the price setting
algorithm.
10The normalisation by the total quantity of portfolio shares means that when every agent wants to sell their
shares in one portfolio, the price will fall by γ between two steps of the algorithm. The value of the intensity
parameter is crucial to the efficiency of the pricing algorithm. If the value is too large, ∆Qt∗ may jump between
positive and negative values without convergence towards the equilibrium price. If γ is too small, on the other
hand, the number of iterations needed for prices to reach equilibrium can be unacceptably large. We allow for
the intensity parameter to adapt within simulations. Specifically, we divide γ by three after ten jumps of ∆Q
between positive and negative values. We multiply γ by 1.1 if no jump in ∆Q has occurred for 20 consecutive
iterations.
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Figure 4.4: Pricing algorithm.

















being a measure of desired net capital flows into country F denominated in country D’s currency.
Analogous to normalising excess demand in Eq. (4.1.18), we normalise, for convenience, desired
net capital flows by the exchange rate adjusted balance sheet size of all agents.
The algorithm schematised in Figure 4.4 can produce prices and exchange rates that come
arbitrarily close to the values that clear their respective market. Since market clearing is
achieved when δ{D,F}t∗ := ∆Q
{D,F}
t∗ /Q̄





t∗ ) in the foreign exchange market are zero, it is sensible to exit the algorithm










t∗ ≤ b) ∧ (δXt∗ ≤ b)
fail else
(4.1.24)
The higher b, the quicker the stopping criteria δ is met and the further prices and the exchange
rate are from their market clearing values. Figure 4.1.7 illustrates this trade-off between com-
putational complexity and achieving market clearing prices and exchange rates. We measure
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computational complexity as the average number of iterations needed before the stopping crite-
ria δ is reached.
Figure 4.5: Trade-off between computational complexity and achieving market
clearing.
When the stopping criteria δ is satisfied, final prices and exchange rates are determined, i.e.
Pt = Pt∗ and XDFt = XDFt∗ + εXt . Note that we add an error term to the exchange rate in order
to account for exchange rate movements that are not driven by transactions in financial assets.
4.1.8 Balance Sheet Adjustments
Once prices and the exchange rate have adjusted to a satisfactory extent, agents sell and buy
portfolio shares and trade cash on foreign exchange markets. The consequence of using the
pricing algorithm presented in the previous section is that new balance sheet positions can,
in an unsystematic way, slightly deviate from the positions implied by agents’ balance sheet
optimisation. Updating the asset side of investor agents’ balance sheets thus requires taking into
account excess demand and supply in shares of portfolios as well as cash payments that result
from transactions in portfolio shares. The computations that lead to the new balance sheet
positions are described in Appendix 5.4.2.
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5 Simulation study1
The previous section developed a model that yields endogenous price and exchange rates
movements while allowing for heterogeneity in assets in respect of maturities, default rates and
inflation risk. To understand the effect of QE in this framework, we calibrate our model to a
domestic market consisting of the Eurozone (EZ) and a foreign market consisting of a sample
of rest-of-the-world countries. Calibrated variables include balance sheet positions, interest
rates, dividend yields, the maturity profile of bond portfolios, inflation risk and default risk.
Both regions comprise two agents, which are calibrated to match investment behaviour of funds
and banks. Agents can trade two asset portfolios per region representing bonds (sovereign and
corporate) and equities. We use several data sources in order to get the model as close to the
data as possible.
Programming of the algorithm was done in python. We used UCT’s High performance Cluster
(HPC) as the algorithm that determines equilibrium prices is very computation intensive.
5.1 Portfolio balance effects from Eurozone QE
5.1.1 Agents’ asset holdings
Agents’ balance sheet positions are calibrated to financial asset holdings of world-wide invest-
ment funds and banking institutions. While there is substantial heterogeneity within the group
of a region’s funds and banks respectively, we model EZ banks and EZ funds, as well as ROW
banks and ROW funds as representative agents for their respective industry, i.e. two agents
per region. Our framework does not limit the number of agents included per region. However,
data availability and computational complexity provide good reason to start with representative
agents.
Our sample of investment funds include equity funds, bond funds, mixed funds and hedge funds.
For the sake of simplicity, we exclude real estate funds, money market funds, pension funds and
insurance companies. Although the investment behavior of these institutions could very well
lead to a portfolio re-balancing effect in response to QE, we assume that mean-variance portfolio
optimisation would be a poor representation of that behaviour.2 All data points are taken from
1This chapter is part of the working paper Koziol et al. (2019), ’Euro Area Quantitative Easing in a Portfolio
Balance Model with Heterogeneous Agents and Assets’
2The insurance and pension fund sector (ICPF) exhibits demand functions for bonds that are distinct from
the rest of the investment fund sector. Due to their long-term obligations and duration gap management, the
ICPF sector has an upward sloping demand function for long-term bonds, i.e. when the price of the long-term
bond increases, the duration gap of any given bond portfolio increases as well and the ICPF investor reacts by
purchasing additional long-term assets to match the longer duration of their liabilities Domanski et al. (2015).
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Q4 2014. Table 5.2 provides an overview of the balance sheet positions, while Table 5.12 in the
appendix provides details on the data sources used. While we assume that all equity and debt
securities on funds’ balance sheets are held for investment purposes and therefore subject to
portfolio optimisation, banks may have other reasons to hold securities (e.g. to use as collateral
in exchange for central bank liquidity). To account for this, we only include bank assets that
are categorised as "trading assets" and "available for sale". Calibrating currency positions for
funds and banks is more problematic. We are unable to distinguish cash positions held for
transactional purposes and for investment purposes. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
all cash positions on funds’ balance sheets are the result of portfolio optimisation while only
excess reserves held by banks qualify as such.
5.1.2 Interest Rates, Dividends and Inflation
Table 5.1 shows the values used in simulations for EZ and ROW nominal interest rates for the
respective bond portfolios and currencies, as well as nominal dividends for equity portfolios.
Furthermore, since agents in our model consider real returns instead of nominal return when
making investment decisions, we set agents’ inflation expectations to inflation forecasts at the
end of 2014 for the year 2015.3 The nominal rates on currency are set to central bank deposit
facility rates for the EZ and the ROW that were effective at the end 2014. The nominal rate
for bond portfolios and dividends (as percent of an equity portfolio’s face value) are calibrated
in such a way, that agents’ initial expected returns at t = 0 for the respective portfolios match
empirical returns for stocks and bonds. For the calibration of expected bond returns, we use
yield to maturity data from comprehensive S&P sovereign and corporate bond indices (see Table
5.17 in the appendix for details). We take a simple average of corporate and sovereign yields
to determine the expected return of bond portfolios in the model.4 Expected returns on equity
portfolios are calibrated by using estimates of equity premia and risk-free rates for corresponding
geographical regions (see Table 5.15 in the appendix). Note that we assume a constant dividend
rate just as we assume a constant nominal interest rate on bond portfolios. While this assumption
would be problematic for an individual stock, it seems reasonable for a comprehensive portfolio
of stocks.
5.1.3 Preferences
We assume that funds’ and banks’ preferences are revealed by their asset holdings (Table 5.2)
at prevailing interest rates (Table 5.1). In our model, these preferences come in the form of
asset-specific risk aversion parameters. Since changing the risk aversion parameters can have an
influence on returns and their variation, we need to use the iterative algorithm schematized in
Figure 5.1. The calibration algorithm starts by simulating the model with arbitrary parameters
for bonds’ nominal interest rates, for equities’ nominal dividend rates and for asset-specific risk
aversions. The dynamics created in this simulation give agents an idea of the variance and
3See Table 5.14 in the appendix for the weighting of ROW countries to obtain representative nominal rates
and inflation rates
4Public and private debt securities have very similar market capitalisations in the Eurozone and in our sample
of ROW countries.









EZ -0.20% 0.93% 5.73% 1%
ROW 0.85% 1.92% 4.33% 2.1%
Table 5.1: Nominal interest rates for asset portfolios. EZ cash rate is the ECB’s
deposit facility as of Dec 2014. The ROW cash rate is the market-cap weighted av-
erage of our sample of ROW countries. See Table 5.14 for details of weighting and
deposit rate per individual countries. Nominal rates for bond and equity portfolios
are calibrated to yield to maturity values for domestic and foreign market indices
(see Table 5.17 for details) and equity risk premia (see Table 5.15) respectively.
Expected inflation values are sourced from the ECB’s inflation forecast for the
Eurozone and the OECD’s inflation forecast for the rest-of-the-world respectively
(5.14).
Figure 5.1: Calibration algorithm.
Trillion EUR Debt Securities (DS) Equities (Eq) Currencies (C) Computed Total AssetsEZ DS ROW DS sum DS EZ Eq ROW Eq sum Eq. EZ C ROW C sum C
Eurozone Investors Funds 1.961 1.651 3.612 0.930 1.821 2.751 0.411 0.218 0.629 6.992Banks 3.204 0.656 3.860 0.571 0.075 0.646 0.08 0.016 0.096 4.602
ROW Investors Funds 0.263 7.045 7.308 0.556 8.461 9.017 0.063 1.202 1.265 17.59Banks 0.568 10.009 10.577 0.078 1.692 1.770 0.136 2.4 2.536 14.883
Computed Market Size 5.996 19.361 25.357 2.135 12.049 14.184 0.69 3.836 4.526 44.067
Table 5.2: Balance sheet positions of funds and banks residing in the Eurozone and in the rest-of-the-world in trillion EUR. Sources:
ECB Investment fund balance sheet statistics, CBD2, Bankscope, IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, Morning Star Direct,
Fred database and FSB Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report.For more details for computation methods and source details see
Table 5.16 and Table 5.12 in the annex.
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covariances of returns associated with each asset. In a second step, asset holdings per agent
are set to their target values documented in Table 5.2 and, for the sake of convenience, prices
and exchange rates are set to 1. We then adjust nominal interest rates for bonds and nominal
dividend rates for equities so that the expected returns for the respective assets are identical
with the data from Table 5.1. The next step is the main part of the calibration algorithm.
We adjust the asset-specific risk aversion parameters for each agent so that they are willing to
hold their targeted asset portfolio at the given expectations of returns. In order to adjust the
asset-specific risk aversion parameters, we use the algorithm in Figure 4.4 employed to adjust
prices and exchange rates within a simulation. We thereby make use of the economic intuition
that an increase in asset-specific risk aversion should decrease the demand for that asset. We
use the following recursive impact function to calibrate risk aversions to asset A, which could be
a portfolio or a currency:
log(λAd ) = log(λ
A






with wAd,0Sd,0 being the demand for assetA according to agent d’s balance sheet optimization, Q
A
d,0
being the targeted amount and γ being the intensity parameter that adjusts the risk aversion.
Once the risk parameters for all agents have been adjusted, the model is again simulated for
100 periods and the procedure is repeated. Note that whenever the model is simulated for 100
periods, we change the random seed to ensure that the risk aversion parameters are not only valid
for a particular manifestation of the exogenous stochastic variables. We iterate the algorithm
500 times to allow for risk aversion parameters to stabilise.
Table 5.3 documents the calibration outcome for risk aversion parameters, while Table 5.4
shows the standard deviation in percent of the parameters in the last 100 iterations of the
calibration algorithm. Thereby it becomes clear that there is substantial uncertainty about the
true preferences of agents. The uncertainty is most salient for risk aversion towards the currencies,
with risk aversion parameters deviating from their means on average by 31% to 246%, while the
other risk aversion parameters vary from 4% to 13%. Note that the uncertainty about the
correct risk aversion parameters for currencies, reflects our uncertainty about agents’ holdings
of currencies for non-transactional purposes mentioned in Section 5.1.1. Since the risk aversion
parameters can generally only be calibrated jointly, it is also likely that it is the uncertainty
about currency holdings that is driving the uncertainty about risk aversion towards other assets.
Strikingly, the asset-specific risk aversion parameters in Table 5.3 are consistently higher
than the typical single-digit estimates of risk aversion found in the literature. For the bond
and equity portfolios the parameters range from 16.36 to 1317.90. While this seems unusual,
it is more likely to indicate missing risk factors than it is to reflect a general problem with our
calibration approach. Note that inflation risk and default risk are the only factors determining
risk in the model. Other factors, such as uncertainty about future interest rates or political
uncertainty, are not represented. Furthermore, the agents in the model are rather cool-headed
and not inclined to overreact to changing conditions, which would generate more price volatility.
The estimates of risk aversion parameters suggest that the assumed risk exposure (in the form of
expected variances and covariances of returns) resulting from agents’ expectation formation and
trading behavior under exogenous default rate and inflation processes (see next subsection) are
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Euro Funds 119.35 63.22 41.09 28.21 13,233.67 126.69
Euro Banks 93.54 52.11 263.28 175.05 19860.89 142.80
ROW Funds 486.37 249.71 22.82 16.36 1646.41 80.41
ROW Banks 1317.90 719.87 54.51 40.27 3071.84 830
Table 5.3: Risk aversion parameters of investor agents for assets.
























Euro Funds 7 7 4 5 31 128
Euro Banks 5 6 6 9 49 227
ROW Funds 13 11 4 5 87 246
ROW Banks 12 12 5 5 49 183
Table 5.4: Standard deviation in percent of risk aversion parameters for the last
100 iterations of the calibration algorithm.
one order of magnitude lower than in reality. Note that this conjecture cannot easily be tested
by looking at historical variations and correlations in returns, as they may differ systematically
from expectations of risk exposures.
5.1.4 Stochastic Processes
Default risk and inflation risk are the only two risk factors that are exogenous to our model. They
are modeled with random variables in order to produce realistic dynamics of endogenous variables
such as prices and returns. Inflation risk is modeled as a simple normally distributed random
variable πt ∼ N (E[π], σπ) with constant mean and variance. The mean E[π] is the region-specific
inflation forecast and the standard deviation being calibrated to match that of inflation data for
the respective regions from of the past 20 years, i.e. 1997 to 2017.5 All calibration results for
the stochastic processes are documented in Table 5.5.
For the calibration of default risk, we use data on global default events from the S&P 2017
Annual Global Corporate Default Study and Rating Transitions (see SP2017, 2018, p.5). Lacking
granular data on default events for different regions, we distribute the number of events per year
to the EZ and ROW region according to their relative total market capitalization. From this
data basis, we estimate the parameters of the following AR(1) process:
ln(E[et]) = ln(E[et−1])(1− ψe) + ψe ln(E[ē]) + εet , (5.1.2)
with E[et] being the expected number of default events occurring on day t, ē being the sample
average number of events per day (i.e. the yearly average divided by 250), and εet ∼ N (0, σe)
5ROW data is taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook and weighted according to market capitalisations
as documented in Table 5.11 of the appendix.
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inflation process parameters default process parameters
E[π] σπ ē ψe σ
e ωDS ωEq
EZ 1% 1% 15/250 0.0011 0.00176 0.5
250%
2
250%ROW 2.1% 0.7% 75/250 0.0014 0.01132
Table 5.5: Stochastic inflation and default processes parameters.
being a normally distributed error term with zero mean and standard deviation σe. Since realized
default events can only be a natural number, we draw et from a Poisson distribution with mean
E[et]. The parameters of the process in Eq. (5.1.2) are estimated in order to minimize the
distance between the data and the stochastic process for the first order autocorrelation A(·) and
variance var(·), i.e.
ψ̂e, σ̂
e = arg min
ψe,σe
(
(A(eyearly)−A(data))2 + (var(eyearly)− var(data))2
)
(5.1.3)
Since the data on default events is available on a yearly basis, while our model simulates daily
data, we aggregate defaults over 250 days in order to obtain yearly default events for the numerical
estimation of Eq. (5.1.3).
Although we assume that equity and bond portfolios of a region are subject to the same
default event process, default rates Ωt do take into account the different risk characteristics of
equities and bonds. The difference in default rates for bonds and equities results from differences
in the loss rate ω per default event, with Ωt = et ∗ ω. While sovereigns do not issue equity, the
bond portfolio contains a 50:50 mix of corporate bonds and sovereign bonds, which for the sake
of simplicity we assume to be free of default risk. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume a
100% loss given default for equities, whereas 50% of a defaulting corporate bond can typically be
recovered (c.p. e.g. Jacobs, 2009, p. 43). With the simplifying assumption that one default event
always affects 2250% of assets in the equity portfolios and corporate part of the bond portfolios,
we arrive at our values for loss rates documented in Table 5.5, i.e. ωEq = 1 ∗ 2250% for equity
portfolios and ωDS = 0.5 ∗ 0.5 ∗ 2250% =
0.5
250% for bond portfolios.
6
5.1.5 Portfolio Maturity
The average portfolio maturity parameter m is calibrated by reconstructing a portfolio that
matches the maturity profile of a representative Euro area investment fund. We compile data
from a sample of 15374 open-end investment funds resident in the Euro area from the Morning
Star database. Table 5.6 contains information on the remaining maturities of fixed income
securities held by the representative fund.
Under the assumption that the maturity dates are distributed equally within a maturity bin,
we can fit the data to our model. Figure 5.2 shows the maturity structure of the representa-
tive fund from Table 5.6 and a fitted portfolio with a constant repayment rate. The maturity
parameter that best fits the data is m = 0.99936, which corresponds to an average maturity of
6.25 years. Fitting the data to more than one portfolio with different maturity parameters only
6The assumed 2
250
% of affected assets per default event means that on average 2% of corporate bond and
equity issuers default each year, which is in line with the data in SP2017 (2018).
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Table 5.6: Maturity profile of fixed income securities of a representative open-end
euro area investment fund in December 2014.
slightly increases the fit. Since stocks do not mature, we set their maturity parameter of equity
portfolios to one.
Figure 5.2: Maturity structure of a representative Euro area open-end invest-
ment fund compared to the maturity structure of a fitted model portfolio.
5.1.6 Other Parameters
Of the three parameters that remain uncalibrated, the expected convergence speed (η from Eq.
(4.1.9)) of the exchange rate towards its purchasing power parity (PPP) is arguably the most
influential. Low values will lead to excess exchange rate volatility, while high values will tie the
exchange rate to its PPP. We choose a convergence speed of 15% annually, which we take from
Rogoff (1996).
For the memory parameter ψ in Eq. (4.1.10), which determines how much weight is given to
the latest observation when agents update their return-covariances estimates, there is no data
nor a literature that we can draw on for calibration purposes. If excessive weight (e.g. ≥ 1%,
in our model) is given to the latest observations, agents will replace large parts of their balance
sheet holdings with high frequency. This can lead to self-reinforcing dynamics, where large shifts
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in holdings increase return volatility, which in turn increases trade volumes. The emergence of
such destabilising dynamics is unlikely to produce interesting insights, as it ensues not from a
realistic representation of investor behaviour, but rather from an unrealistically high sensitivity
of optimal portfolio weights derived from a mean-variance utility function. A memory parameter
ψ = 0.1% is chosen to ensure the stability of the model.
The bound b from Eq. (4.1.24), which determines how close prices and the exchange rate
need to come to their respective market clearing values before the stopping criteria of the pricing
algorithm schematised in Figure 4.4 is reached. We set b = 0.01, which leads to reasonable
simulation times. This choice means that, at most, excess demand for an asset is ±1% of total
quantity of that asset. Furthermore, excess demand for the respective foreign currency is at most
±1% of total assets.
5.2 Results
We conduct a series of experiments to analyse the impact of central bank asset purchases on
international returns and the exchange rate. Thereby we compare simulation outcomes for a
range of QE volumes to a benchmark, where the central bank does not interfere in asset markets.
We simulate asset purchases from 200 bn EUR to 2.6 tn EUR, whereby the purchase volume
refers to the nominal value of EZ debt securities. Each simulation run lasts for 1000 periods, i.e. 4
trading years, and is repeated 20 times with different random seeds. The repetition of simulations
is important to make sure that results are valid for different manifestations of stochastic processes;
in particular the default processes, which reflect different states of the economy.
5.2.1 Asset Returns and Prices
To obtain estimates of the portfolio balance effect of QE on asset returns, we regress the change
between return expectations with and without central bank purchases on the size of these pur-
chases. In order to avoid that serial correlation in the simulated data affects standard errors, we
use a cross-section of observations per random seed by averaging data points across time, which
leads to 260 independently distributed observations and the following regression equation:
∆ E
seed














∗ 250 ∗ 100 ∗ 100 (5.2.1)
Note that we use annualised returns (approximated by multiplying by 250) and multiply by 104
to obtain results in basis points. We use return expectations instead of observed daily returns
to isolate yield effects from price movements. We do this to avoid transitory increases in prices
to influence the impact on yields. To isolate the yield effect, the target variable is the return
a new investor would expect to get from investing in an asset. Expectations in our model are
unbiased. All quantitative results refers to the expected returns. Furthermore, we use EZ agents’
expectations of EZ bond and equity portfolio returns and ROW agents’ expectations of ROW
bond and equity portfolio returns. This prevents exchange rate expectations being reflected in
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES EZ bond portfolio EZ equity portfolio EZ currency
QE -0.598*** -1.96*** 0.206***
(0.000124) (0.000489) (0.000119)
Constant -0.178 0.787 0.742***
(0.180) (0.280) (0.166)
Observations 260 260 260
R-squared 0.897 0.866 0.515
(4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ROW bond portfolio ROW equity portfolio ROW currency
QE -0.0271*** -0.143*** -0.205***
(3.67e-05) (0.000233) (0.000118)
Constant 0.0420 0.145 -0.745***
(0.0604) (0.381) (0.165)
Observations 260 260 260
R-squared 0.162 0.116 0.515
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.7: OLS regressions of QE on expected return variables with het-
eroskedasticity robust standard errors. Upper half: QE effects on domestic assets.
Lower half: QE effects on foreign assets.
return expectations. The impact of QE on exchange rate expectations is documented in ROW
agents’ expectations of EZ currency returns and EZ agents’ expectations of ROW currency
returns.
Table 5.7 shows the impact of QE on returns in basis points per 100 bn EUR of central bank
purchases. All effects are statistically highly significant, but rather low in magnitude. The yield
of the EZ bond portfolio declines on average about 0.6 basis point for each 100 bn EUR the
central bank purchases of that portfolio. The low standard error on the coefficient indicates that
the relationship between purchases and bond returns is well described by the linear regression.
The constant is not statistically significant from zero, which is consistent with what is expected
because the effect on yields by definition is zero if no QE is implemented. With a reduction of
1.96 bps per 100 bn EUR of purchases, the effect of QE is strongest on domestic equity returns.
The positive impact on expected returns on the EZ currency indicates that the Euro depreciates
with the central bank’s asset purchases. ROW-agents assume that the Euro will eventually revert
back to its PPP value and therefore expect a higher return in comparison to the scenario without
central bank intervention.
We do find a statistically significant spillover into the foreign asset markets. The effects per
100 bn EUR of the central bank’s purchases on the expected returns of the ROW bond portfolio
and the ROW equity portfolio are -0.03 bps and -0.14 bps, respectively. Thus, the impact of
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QE 0.0348*** 0.260*** 0.0014*** 0.0152***
(7.22e-06) (6.39e-05) (2.00e-06) (2.54e-05)
Constant 0.00867 -0.180*** -0.00228 -0.0155
(0.0104) (0.0987) (0.00328) (0.0416)
Observations 260 260 260 260









Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.8: OLS regressions of QE on price variables with heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors.
QE on foreign bond and equity returns, although statistically significant at the 1% level, is
economically negligible.
Under our assumption that banks and funds represent the investors that are most likely to
be responsible for a portfolio balance effect of QE, we can use the regression results to estimate
the effects of the ECB’s expanded asset purchase program (APP). Given that the ECB bought
approximately 2.6 tn EUR of Eurozone debt securities between March 2015 and December 2018,
our model predicts a reduction of annualised EZ bond returns of approximately 15.6 bps and
a reduction of EZ equity returns of approximately 50.9 bps. While these reductions in returns
are arguably too small to significantly stimulate the economy, they can have more substantial
wealth effects, which are a consequence of QE induced price changes.
Table 5.8 shows the results of regressing percentage price differences between simulations
with and without QE.7 The price impact on the EZ equity portfolio is by far the biggest, with
an increase of 0.26% per 100 bn EUR of purchased EZ bond portfolio shares. Extrapolating
this to the size of the ECB’s APP predicts that the portfolio balance channel would increase EZ
equity prices by approximately 6.8%. When comparing the 6.8% increase in equity prices with
the annualised 15.6 bps decrease in expected bond yields, it seems fair to say that the portfolio
7The dependent variable is ∆Pseed, QE =
Pseed, QE−Pseed,QE=0
Pseed,QE=0
, while the independent variable is the volume of
EZ bond purchases.
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balance effect of the ECB’s APP is of greater benefit to shareholders than to issuers of debt
securities.
EZ bond prices only increase by 0.035% per 100 bn EUR of purchased bonds. This is not
surprising as there is a tighter relationship between the return and the price of assets with limited
maturity. The relation between the exchange rate and the expected return on currency, on the
other hand, is determined by the expected convergence speed (the parameter η in Eq. 4.1.9)
towards the PPP. Hence, the predicted 0.0138% depreciation of the EUR vis-a-vis the basket of
ROW currencies per 100 bn EUR of asset purchases (amounting to approx. 0.36% for the entire
APP) reflects our calibration choice of η = 15% per year. Note that a lower (higher) expected
convergence speed would lead to a stronger (weaker) depreciation without directly affecting how
QE impacts expected currency returns documented in Table 5.7.
5.2.2 Variation in Return and Price Effects
Although the regressions with averaged data provide estimates of the impact of QE on returns
and prices with high confidence, there is a significant amount of variation in the effects when
comparing individual observations. Table 5.9 documents the distribution of return and price
effects for asset purchases worth 100 bn EUR. Note that all QE-effects apart from those on EZ
bond returns and prices range from negative to positive values within the 5th and 95th percentile
of the distribution. This indicates the difficulty of empirically measuring the portfolio balance
effect when it is phased in slowly. It is unclear why the portfolio balance effect differs so strongly
between observations. We find, however, that the state of the model economy, which we can
measure by looking at stochastic default probabilities, does not have a significant effect on the
magnitude and direction of the portfolio balance effect.
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per 100 bn EUR
assets bought
exp. return EZ bonds -0.62 0.33 -1.09 -0.22
exp. return EZ equities -1.88 1.56 -3.84 0.15
exp. return EZ currency 0.28 0.32 -0.09 0.82
exp. return ROW bonds -0.02 0.12 -0.16 0.13
exp. return ROW equities -0.13 0.78 -1.09 0.89




per 100 bn EUR
assets bought
EZ bond price 0.036 0.019 0.012 0.063
EZ equity price 0.242 0.195 -0.018 0.488
ROW bond price 0.001 0.006 -0.007 0.009
ROW equity price 0.014 0.086 -0.096 0.119
exchange rate 0.019 0.022 -0.006 0.054
Table 5.9: Distribution of the QE effect on expected returns and prices following
a 100 bn purchase of EZ bond assets. Sample moments are computed from 260,000
simulated observations (i.e. the average from 14 experiments with QE ranging from
200 bn EUR to 2600 bn EUR that last for 1000 days and are repeated 20 times
with different random seeds).
5.2.3 Who Sells to the Central Bank?
Table 5.10 shows how agents re-balance their portfolios on the first day of asset purchases by
the central bank. The upper panel documents the changes in market value, while the lower
panel displays the change relative to agents’ previous asset holdings. Note that sales of the
EZ bond portfolio by agents do not add up to 100 bn EUR, but approximately 80 bn EUR.
This is the case because the exit condition in the pricing algorithm is often satisfied before the
central bank succeeds in purchasing all its desired assets. While the central bank purchases the
remaining assets in the following days, we only show the results after the first day in order to
avoid measuring portfolio re-balancing due to exogenously changing economic conditions (i.e.
default probabilities).
We find that all agents decrease their holdings of EZ bonds and increase their holdings of EZ
currency in response to QE. In relative terms, the ROW agents are more eager to sell their EZ
bonds to the central bank. ROW funds sell 11.1% and ROW banks 2.3% of their EZ bonds per
100 bn EUR of EZ bonds demanded by the central bank. EZ funds and banks, who initially hold
a higher share of EZ bonds, only sell 1.1% and 0.5%, respectively. The reason why ROW agents
are more inclined to decrease their balance sheet share in EZ bonds, which is consistent with
the data (see Koijen et al., 2016), is the increased attractiveness of the EZ currency. From the
perspective of ROW agents, an expected appreciation of their currency increases the expected
returns on EZ assets. However, since expected yields on EZ bonds and EZ equities decline at
the same time, it is the investment in EZ currency that promises a higher return after QE. From
the perspective of the EZ agents, holding Euros is also more attractive under QE than without
it. This is the case because the expected return on holding Euros does not change with QE,
while the expected returns on all other assets, domestic or foreign decline under QE. From the
perspective of EZ investors, foreign expected returns decline because agents expect the ROW
currency basket to depreciate in order to reach its PPP.





EZ bond EZ equity
EZ
currency ROW bond ROW equity
ROW
currency
EZ funds -21.1 (8.5) -1.3 (1.4) 22.4 (9.3) -6.0 (11.2) -3e-3 (0.03) 6.0 (11.3)
banks -16.7(9.8) -1.1 (1.2) 16.4 (10.7) -0.4 (1.9) 0.19 (0.3) 1.6 (5.3)
ROW funds -28.7 (13.9) 1.2 (1.6) 28.5 (12.5) 1.5 (6.1) -0.1 (0.3) -2.4 (7.1)
banks -13.2 (5.9) 1.2 (0.9) 12.3 (5.2) 4.4 (7.4) -0.1 (0.2) -4.6 (7.5)
Change in % per 100bn
EZ funds -1.1 (0.4) -0.1(0.2) 5.5 (2.3) -0.3 (0.7) -2e4 (0.00) 3.7 (7.0)
banks -0.5(0.3) -0.2(0.2) 20.9 (13.4) -0.1 (0.3) 0.3 (0.4) 70.0 (273.5)
ROW funds -11.1 (5.5) 0.2 (0.3) 42.9 (18.2) 0.02 (0.1) -1e-3 (0.0) -0.2 (0.6)
banks -2.3 (1.1) 1.5(1.1) 8.9 (3.8) 0.04 (0.07) -0.01 (0.01) -0.2 (0.3)
Table 5.10: Change in agents’ balance sheet positions on the day QE is imple-
mented. Values are means across 20 seeds, standard deviations in parentheses.
Upper half: Difference in the market value of absolute asset holdings per 100bn
EUR of asset purchases by the central bank. Lower half: percentage difference in
asset holdings per 100bn EUR of asset purchases by the central bank.
5.3 Conclusion
We develop a portfolio model to analyse the impact of QE on international asset returns. Our
model differs from those in the literature by allowing for heterogeneity in asset characteristics
and agent preferences. Including these two domains of heterogeneity is crucial in order to capture
the substitutability of assets from the perspective of investors. Data clearly shows that the raw
variance and covariance of returns, which are the sole determinant of asset substitutability in
other portfolio models, are not sufficient to explain investor behavior. Home bias, preferences
for certain asset classes and asset maturity, which we include as a characteristic of assets, all
contribute in determining asset substitutability.
We calibrate our model to represent banks and investment funds from the Eurozone (EZ) and a
sample of rest-of-the-world (ROW) countries. In simulations we find that the portfolio balance
effect in response to QE is rather modest when compared to empirical results from event studies
of QE announcements. For 2.6 tn EUR of asset purchases, our model predicts a reduction in
EZ bond yields of 15.6 basis points and a reduction in EZ equity returns of 50.9 basis points.
Equity prices, on the other hand, are predicted to be 6.8% higher under the ECB’s extended asset
purchasing program than they would otherwise be. Furthermore, we find that ROW investors
sell a much higher relative share of their EZ holdings to the central bank than domestic investors,
particularly ROW funds. This can be explained by a higher attractiveness to hold EZ currency
from the perspective of ROW investors than what would be the case without QE.
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5.4 Annex - PART I
5.4.1 Maturity Parameter and Term Structure
Maturity of asset portfolios is modelled through a constant repayment rate (1−m) on outstanding
assets. In section 5.1.5, we describe how we calibrate the parameter m to match the maturity
profile of Euro area bond portfolios. Figure 5.2 shows how the maturity structure we find in
the data compares to our fitted portfolio with constant repayment rate. The plot shows the
percentage of current portfolio still outstanding on any given date in the future. It becomes
clear from Figure 5.2 that the portfolio within the model implicitly contains many securities
with differing maturity dates. Hypothetically, a portfolio with maturity parameter 0 < m < 1
comprises at least one security for each possible future maturity date. The expected return






with (1−m)mt−1 denoting the portfolio shares that mature on date t. Under certain conditions,
r(t) can be approximated by simulating the model with varying maturity parameters. Note,
however, that the return r(m) on a portfolio of average maturity Tm is generally not the same







The ability to approximate r(t) crucially depends on the assumption about its functional form.
Specifically, r(t) must lead to convergence of the infinite sum in Eq. 5.4.1. Conveniently, the most
common parametric yield curve models used by central banks, i.e. the Nelson & Siegel model
rN&S(t) as well as its more flexible extension, the Svensson model rSv(t), satisfy the convergence
condition.
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defining the estimate of a portfolio’s return, we choose the parameters of the Nelson & Siegel
and Svensson yield curve models so that they minimise the sum of squared differences to the
portfolio returns obtained in simulations, i.e.








Figure 5.3(a) shows the yield curves r(t) implied by exemplary simulated data r(m) for the
Nelson & Siegel and Svensson models. Unsurprisingly, the fit of the Svensson model, which has
two additional parameters, better fits the simulated data as displayed in Figure 5.3(b). Both
models struggle most to fit the very short-end of r(m). In particular, the inverted yield curve on
the short-end seems to be an artifact of the curve fitting exercise. Such an inversion is typically
interpreted as the market’s expectation of an upcoming reduction in central bank interest rates,
which, for the sake of simplicity, is not considered by agents in our model.
Figure 5.3: Relation between the yield curve of securities portfolios, charac-
terised by a maturity Tm and the yield curve of hypothetical individual securities
with remaining maturity t.
Equations (5.4.5) and (5.4.6) can also be used to compute the yield curve r(m) implied by
yield curves fitted to real bond data. Figure 5.4(a) e.g. plots the Svensson model representation
of the yield curve estimated with euro area sovereign bonds, which is published on a daily basis
by the European Central Bank. On the basis of these transformed real data yield curves, model
portfolio return dynamics can be reconstructed for calibration and validation purposes. Figure
5.4(b) plots the time series of two hypothetical portfolios with different maturity parameters that
are reconstructed from ECB yield curve data.
5.4.2 Updating Balance Sheets
Excess demand and supply of portfolio shares need to be taken into account when up-
dating balance sheets. We define Q+ := {d, f, CB|∆Q{d,f,CB},t ≥ 0} and Q− :=
{d, f, CB,U |∆Q{d,f,CB,U},t < 0} as the sets identifying domestic, foreign, central bank and the
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Figure 5.4: Transforming euro area sovereign bond yield curve into model yield
curves and model portfolio return time series.
underwriter agents’ demand and supply of portfolio shares, respectively. The factors correcting










with ∆Qt being the aggregate excess demand for a portfolio of assets. The factors in Eq. (5.4.8)
imply that if there is, for example, an excess demand of 10%, all agents that want to buy those
portfolio shares will only be able to acquire 90% of their original demand. With the correction
factors we compute the new quantities of portfolio shares agents hold on their balance sheet at
the end of period t:
Qd,t =

out tQd,t−1 + ∆Qd,tπt if ∆Qd,t ≥ 0 and ∆Qt ≥ 0
out tQd,t−1 + ∆Qd,tνt if ∆Qd,t < 0 and ∆Qt < 0
out tQd,t−1 + ∆Qd,t else
(5.4.9)




out tQCB,t−1 + ∆QCB,tπt if ∆QCB,t ≥ 0 and ∆Qt ≥ 0
out tQCB,t−1 + ∆QCB,tνt if ∆QCB,t < 0 and ∆Qt < 0
out tQCB,t−1 + ∆QCB,t else
(5.4.10)
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while the underwriter agent, which always tries to sell its entire inventory, does not need to
consider the case of positive excess demand:
QU,t =
∆QU,t(νt − 1) if ∆Qt < 00 else. (5.4.11)
Transactions in portfolio shares can lead to changes in the inventory of domestic and foreign



















as the updated respective domestic and foreign demand for cash after assets have been traded,
and C̃Dd,t = w
CD




t −∆C̃Fd,t as the updated respective domestic
and foreign cash inventories. Cash demand needs to be updated a second time as it does not take
into account the fact that an agent can only buy currency if it is able to supply an equally valued
amount of a different currency. More generally, an agent will only engage in a foreign exchange
transaction if its demands for the domestic and foreign currency are of opposite signs (i.e. one
currency is demanded, the other supplied); and the volume of the aspired cash transaction is
limited by what an agent demands or supplies of the respective other currency. Taking this into














if sgn(∆C̃Dd,t) 6= sgn(∆C̃Fd,t)
0 else
, (5.4.15)
with sgn(·) denoting the sign or signum function, which extracts the sign of the respective updated
cash demands.
Analogous to Eq. (5.4.8) for transactions in portfolio share, we compute correcting factors










with C+ := {d, f |∆
˜̃C{d,f},t ≥ 0} and C− := {d, f |∆
˜̃C{d,f},t < 0} defining the sets that identify
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These are used to compute positions of domestic and foreign cash on balance sheets similar






























Euro area 16.62 5.71 22.33




Total ROW 56.84 43.14 99.98 1.00
United States 29.96 21.94 51.91 0.519
United Kingdom 5.14 2.88 8.02 0.080
Australia 1.22 1.07 2.30 0.023
Brazil 1.65 0.70 2.35 0.024
Canada 1.35 1.75 3.10 0.031
Switzerland 0.27 1.25 1.52 0.015
China 4.74 5.00 9.75 0.097
Colombia 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.002
Hungary 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.001
Indonesia 0.11 0.35 0.47 0.005
India 0.56 1.30 1.86 0.019
Israel 0.16 0.17 0.33 0.003
Japan 9.12 3.65 12.77 0.128
Korea 1.20 1.01 2.21 0.022
Mexico 0.50 0.40 0.90 0.009
Norway 0.19 0.18 0.37 0.004
New Zealand 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.001
Russia 0.15 0.32 0.47 0.005
Turkey 0.16 0.18 0.35 0.003
South Africa 0.17 0.78 0.95 0.009
Table 5.11: Market capitalisation weights used for computation of Rest-of-the-
World inflation, interest rates and expected returns
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Bond indices
Description for Table 5.17: Computation of domestic and foreign market yield to maturity used in
calibration of expected bond returns. Eurozone: We compute a simple average yield to maturity
by using the S&P Eurozone Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index and the S&P Eurozone
Developed Sovereign Bond Index as of 29 December 2014. Rest-of-the-world: We approximate
the rest-of-the-world yield to maturity by combining the yield to maturity of i) a bond index
excluding the US with ii) a bond index with the US to form a world bond index and iii) adjust
this by the Euro area value. i) The row-ex US yield to maturity is an equally weighted average
of the S&P International Corporate Bond Index and the S&P International Sovereign Ex-US
Bond Index as of 29 December 2014, of 1.44%. ii) The US yield to maturity is the equally
weighted average of the S&P US Treasury Bond Index and the S&P 500 Investment Grade
Corporate Bond Index, of 2.06%. The combined world yield to maturity is the sum of i) and
ii), weighted by their relative market size (59% for the rest-of-the-world-ex-US and 41% for the
US), i.e. 0.59∗1.44 + 0.41∗2.06 = 1.69. Lastly, we adjust the yield to maturity of our computed
world bond index by the Eurozone value, which leads to (1.69% − 0.93% ∗ 0.23)/0.77 = 1.92%
for approximated yield to maturity of the foreign market in our simulation. Source: S&P Bond
Indices.
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Data Source Data Description
A ECB Investment fundbalance sheet statistics
Eurozone funds’ holdings in debt securities
and equities, by counterparty region.
B
ECB Consolidated banking
statistics CBD2 and Securities
holding statistics
SHS
Debt securities holdings of banks resident in the
Eurozone area from the ECB’s CBD2. Home bond bias
calculated from SHS.
C Inferred from Bankscope
Bankscope data on Rest-of-the-world banking sector
securities, i.e. available-for-sale and trading securities,
shows a 2.47 larger investment portfolio than for
Eurozone banks.
D FSB Global Shadow BankingMonitoring Report 2015
Global shadow banking sector without Money Market Funds,
Real estate funds and Eurozone funds
I IMF Coordinated PortfolioInvestment Survey (CPIS)
Cross-holdings of equities and debt securities in the global
banking sector, i.e. ’Deposit-taking institutions except
Central banks’
M1 Morning Star Direct
Calculated by multiplying total Rest-of-the-world assets (see
D above) with regional weight for Eurozone debt securities
compiled from Morning Star Direct. Morning Star asset class
and regional weights are based on a sample of open-end
investment funds (see Table 5.13).
M2 Morning Star Direct
Calculated by using weights in Eurozone equity securities
in Rest-of-the-world sample compiled from Morning Star
and total equity assets computed in M4
M3 Morning Star Direct
Computed by using debt securities
weight in Rest-of-the-world
sample compiled from Morning Star
M4 Morning Star Direct
Computed by multiplying total Rest-of-the-world assets (see D)
with equity securities weight compiled from
Morning Star Direct
M5 Morning Star Direct
Eurozone and Rest-of-the-World funds’ cash positions
are calculated by cash securities
weights compiled from Morning Star Direct
(see also Table 5.13)





of St. Louis FRED database
Central Bank Reserve assets





We take the sum of equities and debt securities holdings by
Euro area investment funds statistics
Table 5.12: Data Sources for Funds and Banks’ Balance Sheet Positions used in
Table 5.16
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Euro area, 15374 open-end investment funds
domiciled in the Euro area;
Rescaling total assets to only include cash,
equities and bonds
Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France,




- Equity share: 0.44
- Bond share: 0.47
- Cash share: 0.09
- Out of all cash assets, 65.3%
are domestic cash and






Rest-of-the-world area, 25930 open-end
investment funds, Countries: Argentina,
Australia, Bermuda, Botswana, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,
Czech Republic, Denmark,Hong Kong,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel,
Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liechtenstein,
Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco,
Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Puerto Rico,
Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa,
South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States, Venezuela, Vietnam.
Rescaling total assets to only include
cash, equities and bonds
- Equity share: 0.51
- Bond share: 0.41
- Cash share: 0.08
- Out of all bond assets, 4%
are invested in Euro area bonds
- Out of all equity assets, 6%
are invested in Euro area equities
- Out of all cash assets, 5%
are Euros
Table 5.13: Sample definition and portfolio shares of Euro area and Rest-of-
the-world open-end investment funds collected from Morning Star. The portfolio
shares are used in the calibration of the global balance sheet positions of funds.
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United States 1.612 0.250 0.519 0.1298 0.837
United Kingdom 1.461 0 0.080 0 0.117
Japan 2.760 0.415 0.128 0.0530 0.352
China 1.988 0.350 0.097 0.0341 0.194
Brazil 6.329 10.024 0.024 0.2359 0.149
Canada 1.920 0.550 0.031 0.0170 0.059
Australia 2.513 2.904 0.023 0.0667 0.058
Colombia 2.905 4.089 0.002 0.0079 0.006
Hungary -0.197 1.777 0.001 0.0012 0.000
India 5.800 5.500 0.019 0.1024 0.108
Indonesia 6.395 6.750 0.005 0.0314 0.030
Israel 0.476 0.798 0.003 0.0026 0.002
Korea 1.275 2.536 0.022 0.0560 0.028
Mexico 4.022 0.840 0.009 0.0076 0.036
New Zealand 1.220 3.250 0.001 0.0037 0.001
Norway 2.042 0.490 0.004 0.0018 0.008
Russia 7.824 6.042 0.005 0.0283 0.037
South Africa 6.090 4.801 0.009 0.0454 0.058
Switzerland -0.012 0.020 0.015 0.0003 0.000
Turkey 8.855 7.500 0.003 0.0261 0.031
SUM 1.000 0.85 2.1
Table 5.14: Rest-of-the-world inflation and deposit rates. Deposit rates are
sourced from the World bank development indicators, Fred database of the Federal
Reserve of St. Louis, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, Norge Bank and Hungarian
Central bank for December 2014. Inflation is the inflation forecast by the OECD
for 2015 at the end of 2014.











World 4.50 7.01 2.51 1.00 57.50
EZ 5.73 6.27 0.54 0.12 7.00












Hong Kong 1.92 3.23
South Korea 2.61 1.21
China 3.66 6.00
Table 5.15: Equity premia and risk free rate of the Eurozone and rest-of-the-
world. The Eurozone equity premium is sourced from Absolute Strategy Research,
as of 31 Dec 2014. The risk-free rate is the 10-year government bond for geograph-
ical regions and provided by Datastream. Equity market capitalisation is taken
from the World Bank Development indicators and World Federation of Exchanges
database in 2014 US dollars.
Trillion EUR Debt Securities (DS) Equities (Eq) Currencies (C) Computed Total AssetsEZ DS ROW DS sum DS EZ Eq ROW Eq sum Eq. EZ C ROW C sum C
Eurozone Investors Funds 1.961 1.651 3.612 0.930 1.821 2.751 0.411 0.218 0.629 6.992Banks 3.204 0.656 3.860 0.571 0.075 0.646 0.08 0.016 0.096 4.602
ROW Investors Funds 0.263 7.045 7.308 0.556 8.461 9.017 0.063 1.202 1.265 17.59Banks 0.568 10.009 10.577 0.078 1.692 1.770 0.136 2.4 2.536 14.883
Computed Market Size 5.996 19.361 25.357 2.135 12.049 14.184 0.69 3.836 4.526 44.067
Debt Securities (DS) Equities (Eq) Currencies (C) Computed Total AssetsEZ DS ROW DS sum DS EZ Eq ROW Eq sum Eq. EZ C ROW C sum C
Eurozone Investors Funds A R A A R A M
5 M5 M5 T
Banks B R B R I B RES RES RES
∑
ROW Investors Funds M
1 R M2 M3 R M4 M5 M5 M5 D
Banks I R C I R C RES RES RES
∑
Computed Market Size
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
Table 5.16: Upper Table: Euro area and Rest-of-the-World balance Sheet positions in Trillion EUR. Lower Table: Data sources used







































Date 2014/12/29 2014/12/29 2014/12/29 2014/12/29 2014/12/29 2014/12/29
Yield to maturity 2.01 0.87 1.05 0.81 1.21 2.91
Weighted average 50:50 Weighted average 50:50 Weighted average 50:50
1.44 0.93 2.06
Relative





Table 5.17: Computation of domestic and foreign market yield to maturity used in calibration of expected bond returns. Eurozone: We compute
a simple average yield to maturity by using the S&P Eurozone Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index and the S&P Eurozone Developed Sovereign
Bond Index as of 29 December 2014. Rest-of-the-world: We approximate the rest-of-the-world yield to maturity by combining the yield to maturity
of i) a bond index excluding the US with ii) a bond index with the US to form a world bond index and iii) adjust this by the Euro area value. i) The
row-ex US yield to maturity is an equally weighted average of the S&P International Corporate Bond Index and the S&P International Sovereign
Ex-US Bond Index as of 29 December 2014, of 1.44%. ii) The US yield to maturity is the equally weighted average of the S&P US Treasury Bond
Index and the S&P 500 Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index, of 2.06%. The combined world yield to maturity is the sum of i) and ii), weighted
by their relative market size (59% for the rest-of-the-world-ex-US and 41% for the US), i.e. 0.59 ∗ 1.44 + 0.41 ∗ 2.06 = 1.69. Lastly, we adjust the
yield to maturity of our computed world bond index by the Eurozone value, which leads to (1.69%− 0.93% ∗ 0.23)/0.77 = 1.92% for approximated
yield to maturity of the foreign market in our simulation. Source: S&P Bond Indices.
Simulation Parameters
Agents Parameters
Variable Description Value Source
λd
Domestic and foreign investors’
risk aversion (preferred
habitat) preference
for domestic & foreign
assets








CD Domestic currency quantity 690 Table 5.16
ΠC
F Rest-of-the-World:
Interest on cash, 0.85%




with weights from Table 5.13
and refTab:BS
CF Foreign currency quantity 3836 Row central banks’




Morning Star Direct, calibrated





Equity portfolio 1 Equities never mature


















Row area bond portfolio


















Foreign exchange reversion rate





indicative of market clearing 1%
φ
Memory parameter updating of
the covariance matrix 0.001








MODEL COMPOSITION 1) Profits Description of model equations





















t Overall profit for domestic agent d at time t, which is the
sum of profit per portfolio share times quantities held and
the profit from holding currency

















− ΩDt PDt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
default effect
Profit that accrues for one share in a portfolio D denomi-
nated in domestic currency from the perspective of domestic
agent (i.e. no exchange rate effect)
matDt = (1−m)(1− Ωt)
out t = m(1− Ωt)
all t = out t + mat t = (1− Ωt)
the percentage of performing portfolio shares
that matured overnight
the percentage of performing outstanding
portfolio shares at the beginning of period t
relative to the portfolio shares held at the end
of period t− 1
all performing portfolio shares, i.e. those that
have not defaulted overnight
Name Type Description
ΠDt , (ΠFt ) flow
variable








profit per unit of domestic (foreign)
cash held
CDt , (CFt ) flow
variable
Domestic (foreign) cash quantities
held
V D,(V F ) parameter nominal value of portfolio
PDt , (PFt ) state
variable
price of portfolio share
ΩDt , (ΩFt ) parameter default rate per portfolio share
Q̄D, (Q̄F ) parameter total portfolio shares issued








MODEL COMPOSITION 1) Profits continued














t −XDFt−1PFt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect














CD and ΠCFt = XDFt ρC
F
+XDFt −XDFt−1 Profit per unit of domestic and foreign cash from a domestic
agent perspective, i.e. the interest paid on bank reserves for
domestic cash and the interest on foreign reserves adjusted
for exchange rate gains/losses for foreign cash




































To avoid dealing with economic growth issues within the
model, we assume that all performance effects that mate-
rialise in a period (i.e. all, expect for the price effect) are
payed out to shareholders. Payouts are made in both do-
mestic and foreign currency

















MODEL COMPOSITION 2) Expectation Formation













From the perspective of the domestic agent,
expected real returns of domestic and foreign
portfolios are computed taking into account
an exogenous stochastic process for












− 1 Realised nominal returns on a portfolio share can be
computed by dividing the profit per share that ac-



































Agents need to form expectations about factors that influence nominal profits, i.e.
a) prices b) exchange rates c) default rates
Ed,t[Pt+1] = Pt, i.e. myopic
agents believe in efficient
asset markets
Agents believe the exchange rate will revert to
purchasing power parity X̄DF in the long run
Ed,t[X
DF








Agents know the stochastic process behind default
rates, i.e. Ed,t[Ωt+1] = µΩt , with µΩt being the first
moment of the true default rate process







and η as expected convergence speed towards the purchasing power parity
d) risk
ˆCovd,t(r
x, ry) = M̂d,t
[(
rxt−1 − M̂d,t−1[rx, φ]
) (
ryt−1 − M̂d,t−1[ry, φ]
)
, φ
] Agents compute estimates of variance and covariances ofhistoric real returns through adaptive expectations. The
parameter φ ∈ [0, 1] determines how much weight is given
to the most recent observation








MODEL COMPOSITION 3) Balance Sheet Optimisation
w∗d,t = arg maxw w
′Ed,t[rd,t+1]− 0.5w′ (λ′dΣd,tλd) w
s.t.w ≥ 0 and w′1 = 1
Agents’ optimisation problem Agents calculate optimal weights according to the constrained mean-
variance optimisation problem shown on the left. Determining factors
are the expected returns for the domestic and foreign portfolio, for the
domestic and foreign cash, the covariance matrix of returns and the
assets specific risk aversion parameters. There are two constraints, a
no short selling constraint and a budget constraint (the sum of weights

















′ N × 1 vector of expected returns








′ vector of asset specific risk aversion





























The demand is the difference between the desired balance sheet position
(resulting from the optimal weights) and its inventory at the start of
period t. For portfolios, the inventory is simply the quantity held at
the end of last period reduced by shares that have defaulted or matured
overnight, while for currency, the inventory takes into account overnight




 CDd,t−1(1 + ρCD)︸ ︷︷ ︸






















MODEL COMPOSITION 4) Price adjustment
Prices and exchange rates need to take values that simultaneously
clear the markets of nD domestic portfolios, nF foreign portfolios and
two currencies.










f=1 ∆Qf,t∗ + ∆QU,t + ∆QCB,t
We employ a price-setting algorithm that takes into account the eco-
nomic intuition that excess demand should increase prices and excess
supply should reduce them. For prices we use a recursive impact func-
tion starting with last period’s prices as shown on the left. We add a
star to the index of variables to differentiate between values within and
outside of the price setting algorithm (Pt∗ = Pt−1).
Variable
γ intensity of adjustment
∆Qt∗ Total market excess demand (excess supply if ∆Qt∗ < 0) for a portfolio of assets at
the hypothetical price of Pt∗ . Expectations of returns Ed,t∗ [rt+1] and prices Ed,t∗ [Pt+1],
covariance estimates ˆCovt∗(·), payouts Dd,t∗ and balance sheet size Sd,t∗ all need to
be updated with the hypothetical price when computing demand. The excess demand is
normalized by the total quantity of portfolio shares Q̄ in circulation for a more convenient
calibration of the intensity parameter γ . The normalization by the total quantity of
portfolio shares means that when every agent wants to sell their shares in one portfolio,
then the price will fall by γ between two steps of the algorithm.
∆QCB,t Monetary policy enters the model through the central bank agent’s demand. The demand
of the central bank depends on it’s inventory QCB,t−1 and the amount Q∗CB,t it desires
to hold in period t, i.e.∆QCB,t = Q∗CB,t− out tQCB,t−1. The central bank’s demand does
not change during the intra-day iterative price setting algorithm.
∆QU,t ≤ 0 An exogenous underwriter agent reissues maturing and defaulting portfolio shares by
suppling ∆QU,t ≤ 0. The underwriter’s supply does not change during the intra-day
iterative price setting algorithm.












log(XDFt∗ ) = log(X
DF

































The exchange rate is updated using the recursive logarithmic impact
function on the left. The exchange rate clears the foreign exchange












t∗ ≤ b) ∧ (δXt∗ ≤ b)
fail else










t∗ ) in the
foreign exchange market are zero, it is sensible to exit the algorithm
when all these variables go below the bound b. The higher b, the quicker
the stopping criteria δ is met and the further prices and the exchange
rate are from their market clearing values.
Variable
γEX intensity of adjustment
∆KDFt∗ measure of desired net capital flows into country F denominated in country D’s currency.
We normalise desired net capital flows by the exchange rate adjusted balance sheet size
of all agents
δ Passing criteria for the difference between demand and supply on asset markets and the
foreign exchange market








MODEL COMPOSITION 6) Balance Sheet Adjustments Asset positions
Q+ := {d, f, CB|∆Q{d,f,CB},t ≥ 0}, Q− := {d, f, CB,U |∆Q{d,f,CB,U},t < 0}









New quantities of portfolio shares at the end of period t:
Qd,t =

out tQd,t−1 + ∆Qd,tπt if ∆Qd,t ≥ 0 and ∆Qt ≥ 0
out tQd,t−1 + ∆Qd,tνt if ∆Qd,t < 0 and ∆Qt < 0
out tQd,t−1 + ∆Qd,t else
Once prices and the exchange rate have adjusted, agents sell and buy
portfolio shares and trade cash on foreign exchange markets. New bal-
ance sheet positions can slightly deviate from agents’ desired positions
implied by their balance sheet optimisation. Updating the asset side of
investor agents’ balance sheets thus requires taking into account excess
demand and supply in shares of portfolios as well as cash payments
that result from transactions in portfolio shares. We take excess de-
mand and supply into account by using correction factors πt for excess
demand and νt for excess supply of a portfolio of assets. These factors
proportionately distribute the mismatch across agents.
QCB,t =

out tQCB,t−1 + ∆QCB,tπt if ∆QCB,t ≥ 0 and ∆Qt ≥ 0
out tQCB,t−1 + ∆QCB,tνt if ∆QCB,t < 0 and ∆Qt < 0
out tQCB,t−1 + ∆QCB,t else
QU,t =
∆QU,t(νt − 1) if ∆Qt < 00 else.
The factors imply that if there is, for example, an excess demand of
10%, all agents that want to buy those portfolio shares will only be
able to acquire 90% of their original demand. For the investor agents
and the central bank agent, the new quantities are computed by adding
the product of the appropriate correction factor and their excess de-
mand/supply to the outstanding fraction of previous period’s quantities.
The underwriter agent, which always tries to sell its entire inventory,
does not need to consider the case of positive excess demand.
Variable Description
Q+, ( Q− ): the sets identifying domestic, foreign, central bank and the underwriter agents’ demand (supply) of portfolio shares
∆Qt ≥ 0, (∆Qt < 0): aggregate excess demand (supply) for an asset portfolio aggregate excess demand (supply) for an asset portfolio








MODEL COMPOSITION 6) Balance Sheet Adjustments continued Cash corrections and final positions after trading









d,t−1 −QDd,t)PDt︸ ︷︷ ︸
asset transactions









Transactions in portfolio shares can lead to changes in the inventory of
domestic and foreign currency holdings of investor agents, which in turn
impact their demand for currency. The updated respective domestic
and foreign demand for cash after assets have been traded is defined on
the left,with C̃Dd,t = w
CD





as the updated respective domestic and foreign cash inventories.
Adjusting for the fact, that cross-border transactions can only occur if
currency demanded is the same as currency supplied, the final demand/













if sgn(∆C̃Dd,t) 6= sgn(∆C̃Fd,t)
0 else
with sgn(·) denoting the sign or signum function, which extracts the sign
of the respective updated cash demands.
Cash demand needs to be updated a second time as it does not take
into account the fact that an agent can only buy currency if it is able to
supply an equally valued amount of a different currency. Generally, an
agent will only engage in a foreign exchange transaction if its demands
for the domestic and foreign currency are of opposite signs (i.e. one
currency is demanded, the other supplied); and the volume of the as-
pired cash transaction is limited by what an agent demands or supplies
of the respective other currency.









with C+ := {d, f |∆
˜̃C{d,f},t ≥ 0} and C− := {d, f |∆
˜̃C{d,f},t < 0}
defining the sets that identify the agents demanding and supplying cash.
To allocate excess demand or supply in the currency market, we use
correction factors as defined on the left. The intuition is that if there
is an excess demand of 10%, all agents that want to buy currency will
only be able to acquire 90% of their original demand. The factors
are multiplied with each agents’ individual excess position (demand or
supply) to arrive at the final currency position (see below)
Finally, new quantities of domestic
and foreign cash on balance sheets
are computed with ’excess
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Figure 5.5: Regression diagnostics for Table 5.7 on page 75, column 1. The
coefficient captures the marginal effect of 100bn EUR of QE magnitude (i.e. the
asset purchases by the domestic central bank) on the domestic bond portfolio.
VAL is the difference in the expected return an investor faces when buying the
domestic bond portfolio with and without QE. The expected return of the EZ
bond portfolio declines on average about 0.6 basis point for each 100 bn EUR
the central bank purchases of that portfolio. The simulation includes levels of
asset purchases, i.e. magnitude ‘jumps’, from 200 bn EUR to 2.6 tn EUR. The
relationship between QE and the domestic bond returns is linear because there is
no discernible pattern of the residuals from the linear predicted value.
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6 Conclusions and policy implications
Quantitative Easing has become a prevalent policy instrument for central banks in the US, Euro-
zone, UK, Japan, Switzerland and Sweden in the last decade. While the period of unconventional
monetary policy was accompanied by declining long-term interest rates in those countries, the
transmission mechanisms of QE are not clear. This dissertation focused on specific aspects of
financial spillover in the context of QE and applied heterogeneous agent models to investigate
channels of contagion. This chapter summarises our main findings and presents recommenda-
tions for policymakers concerned with financial sector stability. Finally, Section 6.3 identifies
areas that provide scope for further research.
6.1 Summary of findings
The first aim of the study was to investigate conditions under which QE may affect stability
in a network of financial institutions. Chapter 3 in PART II addressed these questions by
calibrating a spillover model of asset price shock propagation. In essence, Chapter 3 conducted
stress-test simulations on South African banks to study the emergence of liquidation spirals
on the back of banks’ de-leveraging behaviour. We employ a network model that extends the
framework proposed by Greenwood et al. (2015) by including a cash buffer. Systemic risk via
fire-sale contagion is compared across two types of shocks; one to a non-marketable asset of an
individual bank, and the other to a marketable asset held by all banks. In the first scenario,
the largest bank, Standard Bank (SBSA), suffers defaults in its unsecured lending portfolio
causing distress for SBSA which is forced to de-leverage by fire-selling. However, the volumes
of SBSA’s asset sales are not large enough to cause de-stabilising feedback effects in the form
of large scale second-round fire-sales. The main reason for this is that knock-on price effects
can be absorbed by cash liquidity buffers of most other banks. There are a few banks that are
forced to de-leverage in the case of 50% shock, i.e. JP Morgan, BNP, Bank of China, Citybank,
Deutsche Bank and Investec. However, there is no contagion to the three other large banks,
ABSA, FNB and Nedbank, for any of the devaluation shocks to SBSA’s unsecured lending
portfolio studied in the stress-test. This is the primary reason why cumulative banking system
asset losses are minimal in this scenario. Only if fire-sales affect cash buffers and de-leveraging
behaviour of these large banks do losses become systemically relevant. One could argue that the
characteristic of the South African banking system to be highly concentrated amongst SBSA,
ABSA, Nedbank and FNB has a positive absorptive effect on financial system stability. This is
the case as long as these banks are not involved in de-leveraging rounds.
A different picture emerges in the case of a shock to the marketable asset, or more specifically,
to SA government bonds. Here, most banks are involved in de-leveraging from the initial impact
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as cash liquidity buffers are depleted. In the case of a large shock of 50% to SA government
bonds, more than 16% of banking sector equity gets wiped out in secondary de-leveraging and
fire-selling rounds. SBSA contributes most to the fire-sale externality risk due to the magnitude
of its down-sizing. The second most systemic bank in the fire-sale contagion context is Nedbank,
closely followed by FNB. African Bank and Capitec play no role in the fire-sale price shock
propagation. They are, however, the least diversified retail banks, as shown in section 3.2,
which makes them highly exposed to fallouts in their unsecured lending portfolio. We rank
individual banks according to their contribution to systemic risk and show the importance of
cash liquidity buffers in reducing risk to fire-sale occurrences. Last, but not least, we find a
critical threshold parameter, which, if exceeded, makes the banking system highly unstable.
A sensitivity analysis of results finds a critical illiquidity parameter for the shock scenario
regarding SA government bonds. If shocks to this asset class lead to a price effect larger than
1 × 10−13, high systemic risk, which requires policy response, ensues. Finally, we have shown
that the fire-sale contagion channel becomes much more pronounced in the context of QE. The
same shock to the government bond asset class leads to much higher banking sector instability,
assuming that QE leads to a condition of banks taking up higher leverage. The risk to banking
sector losses is not linear, but increases exponentially with higher leverage ratios.
The second aim of the study was to ascertain whether spillover asset price affects can be
attributed to the portfolio balance channel of Euro area QE. In Chapter 2 we highlighted that
the bulk of empirical studies (e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012; Gagnon et al.,
2011a; Ehlers, 2012; Joyce et al., 2011; Neely, 2015; Breckenfelder et al., 2016) finds sizable
asset price effects in the wake of QE announcements and that policy makers emphasised the
role of the portfolio balance channel as justification for QE. However, this stands in contrast to
the theoretical literature incorporating the composition and allocation of public sector debt in
the consumption-based asset pricing approach of macro models (Wallace, 1981; Eggertsson and
Woodford, 2003; Woodford, 2012). Overall, portfolio balance effects of QE are still contested in
the literature (Thornton, 2012).
In face of the research gap looking for models explaining QE-induced portfolio balance effects,
we developed a dynamic agent-based model with heterogeneous assets and investors (Chapter
4). This novel approach is suited to address the research question because it specifically models
assets as imperfect substitutes. Our two-country spillover model is complex and computationally
intensive, but this is required to capture heterogeneity in assets in terms of maturity, default
and inflation risk, as well as in preferred habitat preferences of investors. The core of the model
is about how central bank purchases impact mean-variance investors who allocate their capital
across a domestic and foreign market. Asset substitutability is determined by the risk-return
profile reflected in expected returns and covariance-variance structure of returns. An adaptive
algorithm solves the model numerically which allows us to keep computational tractability.
The third aim of the dissertation was to conduct an extensive simulation study to quantify
QE-induced portfolio balance effects in the Eurozone and compare our estimates with those of
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the literature. The design of the simulation study was justified by incorporating theoretical
and practical considerations. Chapter 5 calibrated the model to a two-country market with
the Eurozone (EZ) representing the domestic market and a sample of rest-of-the world (ROW)
countries as foreign market. It was important to capture a sample representing the global market
size for portfolios of EZ and ROW bonds, equities and currencies. For this purpose, we compiled
data on asset holdings of 15 374 EZ and 25 930 ROW open-end investment funds from the
Morning Star Database, as well as data on investment portfolios of EZ and ROW banks from the
ECB’s Statistical Warehouse, Bankscope and other sources detailed in Table 5.12 on page 87.
The simulation study finds significant portfolio balance effects for the domestic market, albeit
smaller than what could have been assumed from QE announcement studies. The average effect
of EUR100bn asset purchases of the EZ central bank is a decline in the expected return of the
EZ bond portfolio of 0.6 basis points, which means that the APP (EUR 2.6tn) led to an overall
reduction of 15.6 basis points in domestic bond returns. This result is broadly in line with
empirical work of Koijen et al. (2016) who find that the ECB’s APP caused a decline of about
14 basis points in the yield of the 10-year government bond. Perhaps the most interesting result
pertains to domestic equities, where the effect is 7 times stronger than for domestic bonds and
the APP leads to 6.6% higher prices of the EZ equity portfolio.
Somewhat surprisingly, we don’t find economically meaningful spillover effects in respect
of foreign asset returns for our sample of ROW countries. While the impact of the APP
program is statistically significant, price effects on ROW equities and bonds are negligible at
+0.4% and +0.04% in total, respectively. When comparing these results with the empirical
findings from the spillover literature, it turns out that we cannot confirm the notion that QE
influenced foreign asset prices in an economically meaningful way, at least not in respect of
portfolio-balancing-induced price effects of the APP. In addition, domestic asset prices were
impacted to a smaller degree than what was found by Motto et al. (2015); Breckenfelder et al.
(2016); De Santis (2016) or what was found for US programs by Gagnon et al. (2011a); Stefania
and King (2013); Neely (2015).
Do our findings contradict the conventional knowledge about the relationship between QE
and financial asset prices? There are several points to consider. First, the empirical spillover
literature focuses on US-based QE (Aizenman et al., 2016; Mishra et al., 2014; Eichengreen and
Gupta, 2015; Chen et al., 2012) due to its relatively higher importance for the world economy. It
is possible that the portfolio balance effect from the US FED’s LSAP programs were significantly
higher than what we find for the APP, and thus, we need to calibrate our model to the US
market to compare these findings. Second, event studies that don’t specifically disentangle the
underlying transmission channels may be measuring the signalling channel associated with QE
programs in the US and not the portfolio balance channel. Last, but not least, there is the
possibility that it is not the QE, per se, that is driving those empirical estimates of price effects
on financial markets. Greenlaw et al. (2018) have argued that event studies determining large
QE-induced effects suffer from an identification problem, i.e. it is unclear whether markets react
to news on central bank asset purchases or news regarding underlying economic fundamentals.
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Thus, Greenlaw et al. (2018) conclude that the effect of the US program itself on interest rates
is likely smaller than what many event studies claim.
Overall, our findings seem to be in line with Greenlaw et al. (2018)’s skepticism, at least in the
context of the ECB’s APP. Our results lead us to believe that QE-induced asset price effects are
not irrelevant, but only small in magnitude on the domestic market. Spillovers from portfolio
balancing to the rest-of-the-world are negligible.
6.2 Policy implications
The following policy implications can be deduced from the findings of this study. First, our
findings suggest that the effectiveness of Euro area QE in lowering long-term interest rates
through the portfolio balance channel must be regarded with skepticism. While finding a
clear relationship between asset purchases and rising prices for global bond and equity portfolios,
the magnitude of the effect is rather small. From a domestic market perspective, it is not clear to
us that policymakers should engage in massive asset purchase programs if the primary intention
is to ease conditions through lowering long-term interest rates in a meaningful way. Apart
from portfolio balancing, it is possible that QE works through changing expectations of market
participants. However, as Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) point out, if the aim of monetary
policy is to lower the expected path of short-term rates, QE should not be the first choice.
An alternative measure is forward guidance, i.e. the credible and consistent communication
about the future course of monetary policy. The effectiveness of forward guidance is not part
of the analysis of this dissertation. However, it has been shown in many studies that explicit
forward guidance has been a successful tool to lower various interest rates. This would be
conducive to increasing economic activity and inflation (see for instance Campbell et al., 2012;
Gavin et al., 2013; Swanson and Williams, 2014; Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Giannoni et al., 2015).
Second, from a foreign market perspective, portfolio balance effects from Euro Area Quantitative
Easing are not, per se, a threat to financial markets in terms of contributing to higher price
volatility abroad. Policymakers should be more concerned with the effect of QE on the
risk-taking behaviour of banks in respect of their leverage ratio. We demonstrated how higher
leverage in banks amplifies shock propagation in Section 3.4. It is important to monitor the
development of leverage in the banking system in the medium term, particularly of those banks
that are too big to fail.
Third, to mitigate the risk of fire-sale propagation in banking systems, the findings of Chapter
5 point to two crisis intervention instruments. First, the provision of emergency liquidity is
important during a crisis to reduce the likelihood of banks’ asset liquidation. We demonstrated
the importance of cash liquidity buffers to dampen banks’ de-leveraging spirals through fire-sales.
Second, the results suggest that regulators put maximum leverage requirements on hold during
times of stress. Maximum leverage is a regulatory instrument that prevents high risk-taking
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behaviour ex-ante. In times of stress, however, this regulation has the potential to aggravate the
situation by incentivising de-leveraging through asset liquidation. To lessen these amplification
effects, banks should be allowed to have larger than normal leverage ratios temporarily until
systemic risk subsides.
6.3 Further research areas
There are a number of research possibilities which could be pursued further. The network
model studying price shock amplification processes in Chapter 3 uses cross-sectional balance
sheet data from December 2015. The simulation study can be extended by considering more
time points to determine the exposure to systemic risk over time. It was found that increased
leverage has detrimental effects for financial stability in South Africa by increasing risk to
fire-sale amplification losses. More research needs to be done on how banks’ leverage changed
over time and on what drove these changes. Second, an extension of the fire-sale algorithm
to more complex assumptions needs to be investigated. This includes the incorporation of a
binding liquidity constraint in banks’ de-leveraging behaviour. One of the shock scenarios was
to study amplification processes in the event of a shock to SA government bonds. However,
government bonds are used by banks as highly liquid assets to comply with liquidity regulation.
Ideally, the fire-sale model should include a liquidity constraint in the sense that banks are
not able to sell off asset without considering their liquidity position. Some additional analyses
in respect of the fire-sale algorithm will be valuable in order to obtain alternative estimates.
Greenwood et al. (2015)’s model, which we have extended in this dissertation by including a
cash buffer, was among the first models to be put to empirical data. Greenwood et al. (2015)
use a constant holding structure and fixed leverage ratio to study the effect of a debt haircut
for European sovereign bonds on capital losses in the European banking system. They find
that a one percent decline in the price of all assets financed with repos leads to losses owing to
fire-sale spillovers accumulating to eight percent of total equity. Cont and Schaanning (2017)
extend Greenwood et al. (2015)’s framework by including a more complex concave price impact
function which depends on assets’ market depth and selling volumes. The advantage of this
approach is that the illiquidity parameter is much more asset specific than the ’one-size-fits-all’
approach in Greenwood et al. (2015) framework. In fire-sale algorithms, adequate modelling
of the illiquidity parameter is still an open question. More empirical investigation is needed to
determine values that are appropriate for respective market conditions. This idea should be
pursued further to allow for a more accurate estimation of systemic losses given certain shock
scenarios.
Our results from PART III suggest that the portfolio balance channel does not lead to
economically meaningful spillover effects of Eurozone QE into the rest of the world. The
calibration of the model to the two markets, Eurozone and the rest of the world, took substantial
time and effort to match our model variables of assets available in the market with global
holdings of bonds, equities and currency. A first possible addition is to extend the data by
including asset holding from the insurance and pension fund sector (ICPF). We have not yet
Chapter 6. Conclusions and policy implications 108
compiled data for the ICPF sector, thus the simulation of the model on an extended data
set could be a valuable robustness test. Furthermore, it would be a valuable extension to
simulate specific estimates for a country, e.g. South Africa. For this, one needs to calibrate the
spillover model to a three-country setup with EZ as domestic market and two foreign markets
with one representing South Africa and the other representing the rest of the world without
EZ and South Africa. It’s important to capture all investment opportunities for the agents
globally to calibrate preference parameters adequately. Last but not least, it will be valuable to
obtain estimates for US based QE programs. The literature on asset price effects for US LSAP
programs is much larger and we could contribute by providing model-based estimates calibrated
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